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 Abstract 
 
 
 
 
With the ascendance of liberal approaches to economic develop-
ment since the 1980s, developing countries have faced strong 
international pressure to reduce trade barriers with advanced, 
industrialised economies. A striking example is the fate of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) following 
the 1999 trade and development agreement between the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and South Africa. As members (with South 
Africa) of the Southern African Customs Union, the BLNS 
countries are now effectively locked into reciprocal trade liberali-
sation with the EU. The BLNS governments’ acceptance of the 
agreement was accompanied by offers of various forms of 
financial assistance. This report aims to clarify links between 
trade liberalisation and financial compensation, and their longer-
term implications for BLNS countries’ economic relations with 
the EU. How well do compensation programmes conform with 
the liberal rationale of easing transitional economic adjustment 
costs in the move to freer trade? To what extent do they appear 
motivated more by the need to secure BLNS governments’ 
political acceptance of the EU-South Africa trade agreement? 
Analysing several programmes and drawing on personal inter-
views with public officials, the report concludes that compensa-
tion has provided political ‘side payments’ that deviate in 
important ways from liberal economic principles. The broader 
implications for understanding the political economy of trade 
liberalisation and financial compensation in developing countries 
are also briefly discussed. 
xi 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the mid-1980s, global North-South trade relations have 
increasingly emphasised greater and more reciprocal reductions 
in trade barriers. An important recent example is the 1999 free-
trade agreement concluded between the European Union (EU) 
and South Africa. Because South Africa is a member to the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS), its so-called Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU 
meant that the BLNS states have effectively been incorporated 
into that agreement. Currently, the BLNS states and many other 
African countries are also renegotiating their Lomé Convention 
trade relations with the EU. The EU has been trying to direct this 
agreement towards enhanced reciprocal free trade. The BLNS 
countries are moving toward trade liberalisation largely because 
of EU and South African shifts in trade policy.1  
                                                 
1 Henry Bienen (1991: 74-96) defines trade liberalisation as ‘the relaxation or 
elimination of tariffs and removal of duties and/or quotas on exports; alteration 
in non-tariff barriers such as import quotas and quantitative restrictions; 
1 
2 
Meanwhile, aid to the developing world has become linked more 
closely to the acceptance of trade liberalisation. Since the TDCA’s 
inception, the EU has offered various forms of financial assis-
tance to the BLNS countries. These payments aim to compensate 
for the detrimental effects of enhanced free trade, such as greater 
competition from EU products to the SACU market; greater 
competition from South African products for BLNS exports to 
the EU; a partial loss in revenue; and indirect effects from 
changes to the South African economy and from changes in 
investment in the BLNS states. When in 2002 the five SACU 
countries concluded the renewal of their customs treaty, South 
Africa compensated the BLNS states for their move toward trade 
liberalisation through the TDCA.2
A popular liberal belief amongst developed countries states 
that ‘trade not aid’ should help developing countries overcome 
their impoverished position. The BLNS countries were nonethe-
less given aid in the form of financial compensation for their 
inclusion within the TDCA. Trade liberalisation and financial 
compensation in this case are directly connected to each other. 
Recently the ‘trade not aid’ paradigm has undergone subtle 
adjustments. The role of aid in accomplishing trade liberalisation 
has been awarded a more substantial position. As a result, the 
popular motto amongst the donor community concerning the 
relationship between trade and aid has shifted to ‘aid for trade’. 
Although within this view aid is meant to develop economic 
structures for free trade, an alternative goal could be to create 
political compliance with these shifts in trade.  
                                                                                                                            
changes in licensing and direct allocation of foreign exchange, and in specific 
regulations for products; removal or relaxation of export subsidies’. 
2  Compensation in this study is interpreted as financial payments offered by one 
party to another to offset the detrimental effects that originated from a change 
in relationship. In the case of the EU and the BLNS countries, these negative 
effects derive from changes in trade relations caused by the TDCA. 
 
3 
This study was set up to assess the emerging relationship 
between trade liberalisation and financial compensation in BLNS 
countries’ dealings with the EU and South Africa. It examines 
different interpretations of the role of compensation. According 
to one view, compensatory aid mainly intends to serve economic 
adjustment purposes. Another interpretation explains the aims of 
compensation as being to overcome political resistance to further 
economic integration. Finding which view is most helpful to 
explain the compensation payments to the BLNS states clarifies 
the current relation between trade and aid in the case of the EU, 
South Africa and the BLNS countries.3
 
Relevance  
In 1996 the EU’s executive body, the European Commission, 
adopted an influential Green Paper on trade relations with Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. This report proposed a 
shift towards a more reciprocal form of trade with the region.4 
Since then, the world has followed attentively the way in which 
this substantial change in world trade relations is progressing. 
The EU has tried hard to gain acceptance of its policy change by 
those ACP countries involved. By 2008, the EU expects free 
trade zones to be formed amongst the ACP countries, the so-
called regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). With 
these groups of countries the EU hopes to forge bilateral free 
trade agreements. ACP countries, however, have often resisted 
these plans.5 South Africa’s trade policy towards other African 
countries shows similar tendencies. After its shift to democracy 
in 1994, South Africa developed a relationship with other Afri-
                                                 
3  For stylistic reasons this study uses the term ‘BLNS’ to avoid the wordiness of 
repeated references to the BLNS countries. 
4  European Commission (1996). 
5  Moshoeshoe (2003: 55). 
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can states in which both development objectives and trade 
liberalisation were emphasised.  
In view of these ambitious liberalisation objectives by the EU 
and South Africa, and considering the substantial ACP resistance 
against reciprocal free trade, an assessment of the BLNS states’ 
case can deliver useful information. SACU is virtually the first 
region within the ACP area to go along with the EU’s EPA plans 
and the regional free trade structures that accompany it.6 A study 
of parts of the negotiation process leading up to it clarifies what 
to expect from future free trade negotiations with other ACP sub-
regions. This also brings greater rigour into what to expect from 
the EU’s EPA objective for the year 2008. SACU is currently 
negotiating free trade with the United States (US) and has 
recently concluded an FTA with the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA). Negotiations for similar agreements with the 
Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), India, China and Nigeria 
are progressing or are under consideration.7 Explaining what 
bearing compensation payments have on the BLNS countries’ 
trade liberalisation process makes it easier to frame expectations 
about the acceptance and design of these future SACU trade 
agreements.  
Determining whether compensation aims at establishing eco-
nomic adjustment or political compliance, reveals substantial 
implications for economic development in the BLNS countries. 
Installing trade liberalisation without adjusting economic struc-
tures hampers the BLNS economies’ capability to cope with their 
new economic vulnerability. Production, employment and in-
come losses as well as lower customs revenues lurk. Focusing on 
                                                 
6  ECDPM (2001c), ERO (2003d: 3). In similar ways, the SACU-US FTA that is 
currently under negotiation is considered a model for future agreements 
between the US and developing countries in Africa and elsewhere. See USTR 
(2003b).  
7  Meyn (2003: 1), Kirk & Stern (2003: 16), McCarthy (2003: 621-27).
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political compliance indicates widely existing scepticism. Alter-
natively, adjustment of economic institutions is unlikely to be 
successful if political acceptance is not properly addressed. 
Factors such as political leadership, ownership, accountability 
and a long-term vision are crucial for building institutions that 
promote economic development.8
The role of financial compensation as a subset of trade rela-
tions is not always very open to the outside world. Assessing 
compensation payments unveils some of the tools that trading 
partners use as part of negotiations on trade liberalisation. In this 
light, South Africa’s role as a regional partner promoting re-
gional cooperation through a combination of development assis-
tance and trade liberalisation is discussed. The role of the BLNS 
states shows how less wealthy and diplomatically weaker nations 
act when faced with the negotiating tools of stronger trading 
partners. 
 
Existing research  
Since the economic shocks of the early 1980s, development 
thinking focusing on the domestic market has increasingly been 
replaced by theories that promote an opening up to external 
markets. Freer trade is expected to create a better allocation of 
resources and to promote export-orientated investment, leading 
to higher economic growth and development in the South.9 Over 
the past three decades, Latin American and especially Asian 
countries have experienced substantially larger growth and have 
become more integrated into the global economy. As a result, 
trade liberalisation has now grown to be an important focus for 
African countries too. Many blame the continent’s relative under-
                                                 
8  Szepesi (2004). 
9  Dollar (1992), Ben-David (1993), Sachs & Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), 
World Bank (2002). 
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performance since the 1970s on extreme government inter-
ventions in external trade and encourage further trade liberalisa-
tion with the North.10
The so-called Washington Consensus of the early 1980s con-
stituted a shift in economic policies by developed country 
governments. The donor community agreed to strive for macro-
economic stabilisation in the South by pressing for the removal 
of trade barriers and the elimination of government-imposed 
distortions in the economy.11 Today, those involved continue to 
debate whether African governments have accomplished suffi-
cient liberalisation of trade.12 Most donors seem to support the 
view that trade in Africa is still insufficiently free. They therefore 
continue to push for enhanced liberalisation.13
One important instrument through which donors have pro-
moted trade liberalisation with their African partners is develop-
ment assistance. African governments have come under the 
influence of conditional aid, especially from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Other major individ-
ual donors, such as the EU, have set up similar structural adjust-
ment programmes.14  
In spite of ongoing disagreement about the effectiveness of aid 
as an instrument for creating economic development,15 most do-
nors have maintained their aid policies and have tried to bring 
these in line with their trade liberalisation agenda.16 Substantial 
parts of development assistance have come to focus on trade-
                                                 
10  Sachs & Warner (1997), Wang & Winters (1998), Collier & Gunning (1999), 
Block (2001). 
11  Williamson (1990), Haggard (1995), Stiglitz (1998), Leonard & Straus (2003). 
12  Rodrik (1999), Sachs (2000), World Bank (2000). 
13  Lavergne & Daddieh (1997), Hammouda (2004: 3). 
14  Haggard (1995), Mailafia (1997). 
15 Burnside & Dollar (2000), Hansen & Tarp (2000), Easterly, Levine & 
Roodman (2003), Clemens, Radelet & Bhavnani (2004). 
16  Mailafia (1997), World Bank (1998), IMF Staff (2002), Radelet (2005). 
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related capacity building in developing countries; the ‘aid for 
trade’ policy.17 Since compensation payments can cushion vari-
ous effects of trade liberalisation these can also be grouped under 
trade-related aid.  
Much of the existing literature on liberalisation-based compen-
sation payments focuses on developed countries and discusses 
the best ways to compensate groups that are harmed by a move to 
freer trade.18 A smaller body of literature discusses the various 
approaches to Trade Capacity Building (TCB) as part of liberali-
sation in developing countries.19 These studies warn of using 
such TCB programmes as ‘a sweet pill to swallow bitter market 
liberalising prospects’. They do not, however, attempt to scruti-
nise the specific compensation programmes that accompany 
already accomplished FTAs. This study places compensation in 
the above-described context of North-South trade liberalisation 
and asks how these payments have been used to advance trade 
liberalisation in the case of the BLNS states and the EU-South 
Africa FTA. Because compensation payments as a subset of trade 
relations are not always very transparent to the outside world, 
studying the exact way aid is used in the process of introducing 
trade liberalisation can be difficult. This study draws on official 
documents and personal interviews with public officials to fill this 
gap. 
Amongst the existing research on North-South trade liberali-
sation, assessments of the use of financial compensation are 
underdeveloped. This might be due to a prevailing focus on and 
the popularity of liberal thinking. Liberal thinking assumes that 
international support for trade liberalisation is easily accepted by 
states seeking development through trade. However, liberalism 
                                                 
17  Prowse (2002), Jacquet (2002), World Bank (2002), WTO/OECD (2004). 
18  Wong (1997), Davidson & Matusz (2004). 
19  Solignac Lecompte (2003), Szepesi (2004), Powell (2002). 
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does not always explain the particular ways in which both the EU 
and South Africa have used financial compensation to offset the 
drawbacks of the TDCA as experienced by the BLNS states. This 
study aims to assess this emerging relationship between trade 
liberalisation and financial compensation. Including financial 
compensation as a factor in the process of BLNS countries’ trade 
liberalisation and explaining the aims of such compensation 
provides a more complete image of trade relations between the 
EU, South Africa and the BLNS countries.  
 
Intended contribution  
Two opposing views can be used to position and understand com-
pensation for North-South trade liberalisation. Financial support 
can be regarded as easing transitional economic adjustment costs 
that accompany the introduction of liberalisation, such as the trans-
formation of taxes, domestic industries and judicial regimes. The 
opposite perspective, rather than focussing on economic adjust-
ments, emphasises the role of financial compensation in creating 
political compliance. A high dependence on foreign funds makes it 
difficult for developing country governments to refuse these com-
pensation payments.20
The former view, which considers compensation as easing 
transitional costs, fits well within a liberal perspective. The 
theory of liberalism argues that the bulk of economic develop-
ment is accomplished by the introduction of free trade itself. 
Financial compensation is necessary only temporarily and is 
linked to overcoming specific problems of economic adjustment.  
The other interpretation of compensation corresponds closely 
with a realist perspective. According to realism, trade liberalisa-
tion is a highly politicised process in which states seek access to 
foreign markets, while conceding as little access as possible to 
                                                 
20  Kanbur (1998), Elbadawi (1999), Mshomba (2000). 
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their domestic market. Here financial compensation serves main-
ly as a political ‘sweetener’ to gain acceptance of a trade agree-
ment by one or more states that might otherwise see that agree-
ment as unpalatable.  
In the past, both political and economic objectives have influ-
enced the disbursement of aid.21 In similar ways both sufficient 
political support and accommodating required institutional 
adjustments are essential when introducing free trade. This study 
shows to what extent compensatory payments reflect this dichot-
omy. It examines four different EU and South African compen-
sation programmes to the BLNS states and seeks to find how 
these payments serve either or both objectives. Since both a lack 
of economic adjustment and non-compliance in their own ways 
hamper the successful implementation of trade liberalisation, the 
specific design of compensation payments can have a direct 
bearing on economic development. Especially when adjustment 
aims are replaced by political motives, economic development 
becomes contaminated.  
Research approach 
Compensatory aid can supply funding for specific economic 
adjustment measures or function as a political sweetener for 
those who lose out because of trade liberalisation. To determine 
how compensation to the BLNS countries conforms to these two 
roles, this research looks at four characteristics of these payments: 
the term at which compensation is offered; its targeting to specific 
areas; how much money is involved; and the issue of being tied to 
the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agree-
ment (TDCA). 
                                                 
21  Schraeder, Hook & Taylor (1998), Alesina & Dollar (2000). 
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The term at which compensation payments are offered is one 
criterion that helps to determine the approach best suited for 
explaining the nature of compensation payments. If financial 
assistance only helps the BLNS countries get through a specific 
period of adjustment after which these payments will be discon-
tinued, easing economic adjustment seems to be the more promi-
nent goal. This approach loses credibility when the term of 
compensatory aid is not decided on the basis of a calculated 
adjustment period. In such situations, the term of funding is 
either open-ended or too short to accomplish the goals of eco-
nomic adjustment. When the term is decided on the basis of 
accomplishing political acceptance for free trade, compensation 
is provided either on a one-off or on an open-ended basis de-
pending on the specific political demands.  
Similar inferences can be made concerning the targeting of 
compensatory payments. The more the funds are directed to 
specific sectors that are adversely affected by the implementation 
of free trade, the stronger the economic adjustment argument. 
However, if compensation is supplied as a lump sum of money 
transferred to the respective BLNS governments, the opposite idea 
of the EU obtaining political support for a free-trade relationship 
becomes more plausible.  
Regarding amount, a realistic match between the size of com-
pensation and the economic objectives of a compensation pro-
gramme supports the economic adjustment view. When a com-
pensation programme holds economic adjustment aims for which 
the amount is inadequate or excessive, compensation comes more 
in line with conditions for securing political support.  
According to liberal theory, the economic benefits of more 
open trade alone, perhaps supported by minor forms of policy 
adjustment, should be sufficient to create the acceptance of trade 
liberalisation. If compensation is offered on the condition of free 
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trade acceptance, it should be done in combination with a well-
defined commitment to targeted adjustment measures. However, 
when compensation payments are disbursed solely on the condi-
tion of free trade acceptance, independent of other criteria such 
as economic targeting, the opposite view gains credibility. Link-
ing compensation to TDCA acceptance without attaching a 
commitment to targeted adjustment measures means using finan-
cial pressure directly to enforce the acceptance of free trade.  
If a compensation programme’s main purpose is to ease eco-
nomic adjustment, its term, targeting and amount are calculated 
and specifically determined on the basis of economic adjustment 
goals. Its linkage to TDCA acceptance is accompanied by 
adjustment policies. These characteristics indicate the EU’s and 
South Africa’s intentions of using compensation payments as a 
form of additional economic support to help pave the way for 
creating free trade with the developing world. They showcase a 
North-South relationship in which the importance of the 
developmental aspects of free trade is promoted by the advanced 
industrialised states and willingly accepted by the developing 
world. This outcome corresponds with a political theory of 
liberalism. A compensation programme that conforms to these 
criteria also implies that the ‘aid for trade’ paradigm, which sees 
aid as having to provide economic support for free trade 
development, would be endorsed. Since institutional support for 
economic adjustment to trade liberalisation is greatest under these 
circumstances, the possibility that free trade will create economic 
development is also enhanced. 
If compensation payments match a political acceptance 
approach, then the term, targeting, amount and tie to the TDCA 
are unrelated to economic adjustment. These aspects are more 
closely related to attracting the political support of governments. 
Correspondence with this interpretation indicates that, to a 
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certain extent, governments in the BLNS states have objections 
to the introduction of free trade. Support for free-trade thinking 
as propagated by western actors is not fully shared by the BLNS 
governments. Such resistance is overcome by offering financial 
aid to those that make the decisions on economic policy in the 
developing world. This perception fits well within a theory of 
realism. Within a perspective that focuses on securing political 
acceptance, the role of aid to stimulate economic changes, which 
the ‘aid for trade’ paradigm promotes, would be contradicted. If the 
majority of compensatory funding goes on creating political accep-
tance, less money will be left for institution building. A solid basis 
for the introduction of free trade will thus be affected, making it 
more difficult for free trade to effectively add to economic 
development. Finally, a certain design would also signal an impor-
tant political vulnerability of BLNS governments. 
The possibility exists that these two views overlap between 
various TDCA-related payments or between different criteria of a 
single compensation programme. The four criteria mentioned 
here help to determine how the two theories relate to each other 
and what the exact nature of this compensation is. 
 
Methodology 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are all part of SACU 
and are thus experiencing the same sudden access of the EU into 
their economies. The BLNS states are therefore treated equally 
for the purpose of this study. Their shared dependence on South 
Africa as a major regional economic actor and SACU partner 
with a strong influence on their economic policies in the past and 
the present adds to this belief. Their exemplary position as a 
whole for other ACP regions further justifies why the four BLNS 
countries are regarded as one case as far as possible. However, in 
those situations in which differences are relevant to the argument 
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this research tries to make, it differentiates amongst the four 
states.  
With the help of the method of process tracing this study 
shows how the EU and South Africa have acted in recent trade 
negotiations with each other and with the BLNS states. In 
process tracing the chain of events that links the causal factor of 
a hypothesis to its outcome is studied. Evidence is provided for 
each step within that chain.22  
The information for this case study derives from personal 
interviews with public officials, primary government documents 
and existing studies. For information on trade liberalisation in the 
BLNS states and EU and South African influence thereon, this 
paper draws mainly on existing studies. Regarding compensation 
payments, primary EU, South African, BLNS states and SACU 
government documents are used. Existing research and media 
documentation help to further underpin this information. Finally, 
personal interviews with EU and South African government 
officials involved with the negotiation and implementation of the 
TDCA and with independent researchers on Africa’s political 
economy help to add new views and support existing opinions.  
The BLNS states can be considered both typical and atypical 
for a larger group of countries. They are atypical regarding their 
long history as a customs union and the remarkable effectiveness 
of that union. This places the BLNS countries ahead of other 
regions in the ACP area in terms of regional economic integra-
tion. On the other hand, all ACP members are currently renego-
tiating their trade relationships with the EU towards more 
enhanced reciprocity, functioning along regional lines. Their 
stronger and further developed relations with the EU and South 
Africa make the BLNS countries a good test case for large parts of 
the rest of the continent. Their customs union with South Africa is 
                                                 
22  Van Evera (1997: 64). 
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also regarded by some as a building block for the larger SADC 
area.23 This makes a study of the BLNS countries relevant to a 
broader set of cases, particularly to other ACP countries. 
The appendix presents a technical framework for the method-
ology used for this study. It divides the case study into a number 
of variables and discusses their relationship to each other on the 
basis of a causal diagram. The methodological framework also 
expands on the class of relevant cases and the positioning of the 
BLNS states within that group. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of Western economic pressure 
to liberalise on the shifts in BLNS states’ trade policies. An 
overview is given of the past and present relationship between 
the EU, South Africa and the ACP states. The main focus is on 
the effects of the TDCA on the BLNS states. The following 
chapter examines the relationship between compensation pay-
ments and international pressure to liberalise. It outlines four 
different compensation programmes and scrutinises their con-
tents. Finally, Chapter 4 uses the two opposing models to assess the 
compensation programmes and their implications for trade and aid 
relationships between the EU, South Africa and the BLNS states. 
 
                                                 
23  Gibb (1997: 68). 
 
  
 
 
2 
Trade liberalisation and 
Western pressure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade policies since the 1980s have shifted globally towards 
enhanced forms of liberalisation. This chapter examines the 
impact of Western economic pressure to liberalise on the shifts in 
the BLNS states’ trade policies. A discussion of the role of 
various BLNS partners in the international trading system and an 
assessment of their visions, instruments and actions gives an 
impression of how western leverage operates. This chapter 
begins with an assessment of how trade liberalisation since the 
1980s has shifted globally. It then examines the relationship 
between the EU and Africa. An overview of the history and 
nature of EU development cooperation helps to determine the 
pressure on ACP countries to liberalise over time. Whether South 
Africa uses inducements to achieve the relaxation of trade barri-
ers is assessed thereafter. The effects of the TDCA and the new 
SACU agreement on Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
further discloses the impact of trade liberalisation pressure by the 
EU and South Africa.  
15 
16 
Trade, aid and the neo-liberal era 
From the mid-1980s onwards, western countries have increas-
ingly emphasised greater and a more reciprocal reduction of trade 
barriers. At roughly the same time a change in global economic 
structures occurred that is often referred to as the globalisation of 
the world economy. New communication technologies, easier 
transport and faster financial flows made national borders less 
relevant. Transnational corporations working in a system of free 
trade became the focus of economic activity. And the liberal 
doctrine of non-intervention and the free play of market forces 
have received new interest.1  
When the relaxation of border restrictions on trade and 
investment occurred in the 1980s, the remaining regulatory 
differences between developed countries suddenly became more 
significant. Advanced industrialised countries therefore sought to 
improve the integration of ‘behind the border’ policies. This 
more enhanced form of liberalisation, often referred to as deep 
integration, adjusts policies at a national level around an inter-
nationally negotiated norm and ranges from the harmonisation of 
standards to macroeconomic policy coordination.2 Especially in 
Europe, the idea of deep integration has found a strong foothold.  
As a result of this shift in trade policy, liberalising western 
powers have also come to consider free trade as a new basis for 
their relationship with the developing world.3 The macroecono-
mic position that the developing states found themselves in 
during the 1980s laid the foundations for this movement. High 
balance of payments deficits and extensive amounts of foreign 
debt first created the need for policy change. When help was 
                                                 
1  Burchill (2001). 
2  Haggard (1995: 1-14). 
3  Draper (2003: 6). 
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called in from the international financial institutions, a second 
incentive for reform, called conditionality, was introduced. The 
conditionality norm was used to promote further measures of 
trade liberalisation by developing nations in exchange for 
development assistance. This helped developed countries to en-
hance economic integration in the South.  
Simultaneously, changes in the international regime governing 
world trade and investment also made it necessary for developing 
countries to start offering more concessions towards reciprocal 
forms of free trade. The emerging economic dependence that the 
1980s brought about and the shifting trade relations resulting 
from this made deep integration become more salient in the 
South. Sub-Saharan Africa’s relative economic unimportance 
has, however, stopped the North from stimulating high levels of 
deep integration in this region.4
The removal of trade barriers, or shallow integration, in Sub-
Saharan Africa has by now reached a higher position on the 
agenda of the advanced industrialised states. It is argued that 
when trade restrictions are removed, the developed and the 
developing world economies can converge more easily than 
under a system of highly protected economies. These more 
highly integrated economies will then accelerate economic 
growth in the South. Those who want to overcome their position 
of underdevelopment, liberals argue, should follow the pace of 
globalisation and trade liberalisation.5 The aforementioned 
financial dependence on international financial institutions 
during the 1980s has contributed importantly to the enhancement 
of free trade in the developing world. The structural adjustment 
programmes of the IMF and the World Bank that have been 
implemented in many developing countries since the 1980s have 
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tended towards a neo-liberal approach.6 By allowing nearly 
eighty per cent of all Structural Adjustment Loans to hinge on the 
concession of trade policy reform and macroeconomic stabili-
sation, the IMF and the World Bank have, more than most other 
actors, contributed to a higher level of shallow integration in the 
South.7
Following on from the ascendance of neo-liberal thinking, 
insufficient results from donor-related funding to Africa and the 
successful way Asian economies have managed to develop over 
the past twenty-five years without the help of large amounts of 
aid, development policies have gained popularity in which the 
improvement of trade, rather than the effectiveness of aid, is the 
focus of attention.8 The so-called ‘trade not aid’ advocates that 
came to prominence in the 1980s argue that focusing on cash and 
project assistance is at best a distraction and possibly even 
harmful in terms of promoting prosperity. Keeping their markets 
open is therefore considered the best strategy the developed 
world can follow in order to support developing nations’ eco-
nomies. Governments of poor countries, in this view, should 
participate more actively in the global economy by removing 
barriers to trade and by eliminating government-imposed distort-
ions in the economy.9 Such measures of shallow integration 
could take place at the bilateral, regional or multilateral level. 
Constructing regional economic integration schemes amongst 
African countries is a prime objective of western countries that 
should help liberalise Third World trade policies and strengthen 
their economies.10  
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More recently, the donor community has made adjustments to 
its stance on the relationship between trade and aid and the ‘trade 
not aid’ debate. While free trade is still considered the main 
driver for development, the perception of aid as an instrument to 
accomplish trade liberalisation in the developing world has 
received more attention. Development aid is increasingly tar-
geted towards the strengthening of export capacities. This means 
that development assistance now goes to trade-related essential 
services such as providing insurances, upgrading standards and 
assisting developing countries with certification. The mainte-
nance of roads, ports and other transport infrastructure has also 
gained priority.11 Even though the idea of an enhanced role for 
free trade is still eminent, practical considerations have meant 
that aid is considered an important driver of liberalisation. 
Stemming from this view, the motto ‘aid for trade’ is often heard. 
Changes in EU and South African trade policies 
An important western power that has promoted the liberalisation 
of trade over the last few decades is the European Union. Both 
between countries that are part of the EU and towards those 
outside the union, a strong move in the direction of the opening 
up of markets has emerged. Inside its boundaries, the free 
movement of capital, labour and products has constituted an 
enhanced form of deep integration. But also with regard to its 
external trading partners, the EU has pushed for free trade.12 
Stimulation to liberalise trade by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) has contributed significantly to this behaviour. The WTO 
demands the liberalisation of global trade in goods and services 
of all its members. Although the EU is generally seen to pursue 
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higher levels of free trade with other regions, it is also often 
blamed for its protective nature. Such criticism has come to focus 
especially on its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).13
 
EU development cooperation  
In post-colonial times, the European Union and its forerunners 
have been of great influence on the economic development of 
Third World countries, especially those in Africa.14 Through its 
European Development Fund, it has awarded African countries 
substantial amounts of development assistance.15 The EU has 
tried to spur economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa using 
direct financial donations, project and programme assistance, and 
preferential trading systems. Soon after the period of decolonisa-
tion, trade agreements on the basis of non-reciprocity became 
part of the larger development policy for the ACP region. 
The 1963 and 1969 Yaoundé Conventions were the first major 
trade and development agreements to be forged between the EU 
and a large group of African nations. Under these conventions 
the European Economic Community (EEC) offered eighteen of 
the former French and Belgian colonies in Africa a combination 
of development aid and favourable trade policies.16 In return, the 
EEC asked for reversed trade preferences and for the right to own 
commercial enterprises in these countries.  
In 1975 African nations blocked attempts by the EU to 
negotiate a successor to the Yaoundé agreements. Many of them  
 
                                                 
13  Halderman & Nelson (2004), Borell & Hubbard (2000: 18-26). 
14  Grilli (1993: xiv). 
15  However, this was not the beginning of development aid in general. Since the 
end of World War II individual countries in Europe had already started supply-
ing development funds to countries which at that stage were still their colonies. 
16  In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Economic Community 
(EEC) into what came to be called the European Union (EU). 
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Photo 1      Trade in Africa: Takoradi, Ghana 
[Source: Audiovisual Library of the European Commission] 
 
 
had grown sceptical about their economic bonds with the western 
world, which they perceived as a relationship of dependency 
based on the legacy of colonialism.17 African plans for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) called for a change in the 
international economic system that would increasingly favour 
African and other Third World countries’ economies.18 In 1975 
the first of four Lomé Conventions was thus signed between the 
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EU and forty-six African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) coun-
tries. This group would eventually expand to include seventy-
eight members. Besides offering financial and technical coop-
eration through the European Development Fund and the Euro-
pean Investment Bank, the treaty now contained non-reciprocal 
provisions for free exports going from ACP states to the EU. 
This form of unilateral self-imposed free trade by the EU was 
introduced as a way of encouraging economic development in the 
ACP region. This trade relationship of non-reciprocity would 
eventually continue for twenty-five years, until the signing of the 
Cotonou Agreement in 2000. 
The preferential conditions under Lomé extended progress-
sively with its three successors, Lomé II, III and IV. However 
with the beginning of the financial crisis in the 1980s, a shift 
away from project-based to policy-based financial assistance 
developed.19 The 1984-1985 Lomé III negotiations showcased 
the initial steps in this process. A resolution on structural adjust-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa was adopted in 1988.20 But only 
with the inception of Lomé IV in 1990 did it become clear that 
structural adjustment, instead of project purposes, as well as the 
development of the private sector were gaining ground as part of 
development cooperation policies.21 When Lomé IV expired in 
1999 and a new trade and development treaty had to be 
negotiated, the EU called for serious changes that matched a 
more liberal stance on trade and development. The non-reci-
procal free-trade relationship that had been introduced in the 
1970s was now to be abandoned. This eventually resulted in the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000. 
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21  Haggard (1995: 102). 
 
23 
 
 
Photo 2   Paul Nielson, European Commissioner for  
 Development and Humanitarian Aid from 1999  
 to 2004 
[Source: Audiovisual Library of the European Commission] 
 
 
The Cotonou Agreement 
The Cotonou Agreement is a framework for future negotiation, 
not a long-term trade and development treaty, which the 
Yaoundé and Lomé conventions were.22 During negotiations it 
was agreed that the EU and the ACP nations would start 
developing a relationship on the basis of complete trade liberali-
sation. This primarily meant a shift towards more reciprocal 
methods of trade.  
The foundations for the Cotonou Agreement had been laid four 
years earlier, in 1996. In that year the European Commission 
published a document under the title Green Paper on Relations 
between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve 
of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for a New Partner-
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ship.23 The paper formulated new guidelines for the EU’s trade 
and development policies with the ACP. It then became clear that 
the EU was to adopt enhanced forms of neo-liberal thinking. It 
pursued the liberalisation of trade relations with its developing 
world trading partners. Trade and a relationship of enhanced 
shallow integration became its primary strategy for the enhance-
ment of economic development and the fight against poverty in 
Africa.24  
With the emergence of globalisation and the popularity of neo-
liberal thinking in the 1980s, the EU came to consider it essential 
that a shift in trade and aid relations with the ACP region occur. 
Many ACP countries had by then grown highly dependent on the 
trade and development aid provisions of the Lomé treaties.25 As 
large groups in the North came to consider past aid-flows as 
mainly unsuccessful – a phenomenon sometimes referred to as 
‘donor fatigue’ – a call for changing relations developed. Along-
side the then-burgeoning ‘trade not aid’ debate, the EU called on 
ACP countries to take greater responsibility for managing their 
own economies. This was to reduce their dependency on the 
large sums of development aid that they had received since the 
beginning of Lomé I. 
Global sentiments on the enhanced liberalisation of trade that 
then emerged shifted the rules of the multilateral trading system. 
This again influenced EU-ACP relations. The General Agree-
ment on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and later the WTO, re-
quested a new EU-ACP trade agreement that was compatible 
with many of those rules. Article XXIV of GATT, which deals 
with trade arrangements between developing and developed 
                                                 
23  European Commission (1996). 
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nations, called for the introduction of trade on a basis of reci-
procity.  
During the mid-1990s these various incentives led the Euro-
pean Commission to fundamentally reconsider its relationship 
with the ACP region.26 Eventually, in 1996, the Green Paper on 
relations between the European Union and the ACP was released, 
launching a new vision of trade after Lomé IV.27 The paper’s 
primary focus was on the need for WTO compatibility and 
reciprocal trade.28 Succeeding the provisions under GATT, all 
WTO members agreed to strive for higher levels of global free 
trade. Binding commitments were made to improve market 
access between states within a set time-frame. Therefore, when 
talks about a successor to the Lomé treaty started in 1998, the 
Green Paper formed the basis from which to negotiate for the 
EU.  
In June 2000 the EU and ACP states signed the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement in Cotonou, the capital of Benin. This 
was not an actual agreement but instead a framework for 
negotiations to be continued at a later stage. It focuses on the 
issue of moving from non-reciprocal to reciprocal trade, as is 
compatible with WTO requirements. Both parties, the EU and the 
ACP region, have requested a waiver from the WTO to last until 
January 2008, when a new WTO-compatible agreement must be 
in place.29 Till then, the current non-reciprocal tariff preferences 
shall remain in place.  
                                                 
26  Le Pere (2000: 1-4). 
27  The European Commission publishes Green Papers and White Papers. The 
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for EU action in a certain area and are meant to lead directly to policy develop-
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28  Thomas (1997). 
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In the intervening time the EU aims to gradually establish 
reciprocal free trade with the ACP region. All ACP countries 
may opt for either an individual trade relationship with the EU or 
a collective trade relationship under which they operate as a 
regional grouping, the so-called Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs).30 The latter option has received most attention and 
is preferred by the EU.31 The EU considers most African 
economies too small to be able to effectively compete with those 
of developed countries.32 EPAs, it argues, enable developing 
countries to confront the problems of exclusion caused by 
globalisation more effectively. These regional agreements 
stimulate the economic, regulatory and institutional reforms that 
improve the investment climate in ACP countries and enable 
private-sector development. The EU also expects EPAs to 
enhance the involvement of women in economic, political and 
social life. They encourage sustained economic growth, increased 
competitiveness, the creation of productive jobs and better access 
to social services such as health, education and training.33  
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are exempted from the 
shift towards reciprocity. They may choose either to accept the 
new standards of trade or to stay with the old non-reciprocal 
preferences. Whichever the LDCs opt for, they will maintain free 
access to the EU market for all products except arms.34 Although 
the LDCs might seem better off under non-reciprocity, the 
benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. Besides market access, 
EPAs also include agreements on services and other trade-related 
                                                 
30  Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were initially called Regional Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreements (REPAs). There is, however, little difference in 
the form and function of the two. See ECDPM, ‘Regional Economic Partner-
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31  ECDPM (2001d). 
32  Asante (1997: 17). 
33  Le Pere (2000: 4). 
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issues, which are not included under the non-reciprocal pro-
visions. Benefits typical to regional integration, such as attracting 
investors, can also improve economic conditions for LDCs.35  
Besides a trade chapter, the Cotonou Agreement also offers an 
aid protocol. The European Development Fund (EDF), the EU’s 
main financial instrument for development cooperation, and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) will provide funding for the 
ACP region’s economic adjustment to trade liberalisation. In July 
2003 for instance, a €50 million trade capacity-building pro-
gramme called Trade.Com was launched for the ACP countries. 
Negotiating the transformation towards a reciprocal EU-ACP 
trade agreement is likely to continue until the end of 2007. This 
process has been divided into two phases. During Phase I the 
various parties negotiated a broad framework at the all-ACP 
level. Phase II, which started in 2003, is now being negotiated at 
the regional level. By 2008 the Lomé Agreement should be 
replaced by reciprocity for all non-LDCs and the group of LDCs 
that have chosen to join the EPA plans. 
 
EU liberalisation pressure  
Economic integration with advanced industrial states means 
having to adjust profoundly to developed countries’ economic 
policies. Developing states have therefore not always whole-
heartedly embraced trade liberalisation.36 ACP countries too have 
often uttered their disapproval of the EU’s intention to relinquish 
non-reciprocal trade. They have been reluctant to abandon the 
trade preferences that they received for more than twenty-five 
years under the various Lomé treaties. Open borders were 
considered tantamount to enhanced competition from the tech-
nologically more advanced economies in the North. Fearing the 
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global move towards trade liberalisation and possible exploita-
tion, ACP governments initially expressed their desire to broaden 
preferences with the EU.37
The EU, however, pursuing the acceptance of its reciprocity 
plans, has had the advantage of several leverages. One concerns 
the aid component that traditionally accompanies trade agree-
ments between both parties. During the Cotonou negotiations it 
soon became clear that the EU intended to scale down its budget 
for development assistance, which has been substantial since the 
beginning of Lomé. Many developing countries are in dire need 
of financial help but their high dependence on foreign funds 
often creates a situation in which they are willing to abide by the 
policy demands of developed countries.38 Tying aid to policy 
changes has been called the conditionality norm.39 At the 1990 
Lomé IV Agreement a strong form of conditionality was intro-
duced in EU-ACP relations and when the Cotonou negotiations 
began, the EU expanded its use. Not immediately deciding how 
seriously to cut its aid programme, it offered the ACP states the 
possibility of keeping reductions low in return for concessions in 
the trade chapter.40  
To promote ACP acceptance of the new trade provisions, the 
EU has often argued that WTO compatibility is imperative. If no 
agreement was signed, a new waiver from the WTO would no 
longer be obtainable. However, since the conclusion of the 
agreement, this argument has repeatedly been contested. Former 
WTO Deputy Director Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza declared in 
2000 that no existing WTO rule would make it necessary for EU-
ACP trade relations to shift from the Lomé conventions to 
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reciprocal free trade agreements.41 The EU has, therefore, been 
said to uphold self-defined criteria for WTO compatibility. Its 
focus on the EPA initiatives makes it difficult for ACP states to 
determine what opportunities for WTO-approved reciprocal trade 
exist outside these agreements.42
During the negotiating process the EU hardly diverged from 
the propositions that it initially made in its 1996 Green Paper.43 It 
was in the position to do so as the ACP group in many respects 
formed a disparate negotiating partner. The EU’s political bar-
gaining power had accumulated over a period of almost forty 
years and by the time of the Cotonou talks significantly outper-
formed that of ACP countries.  
The various strengths and leverages constituted a powerful 
tool which the EU could use to influence ACP trade policies. 
Within an environment of high financial dependence on the 
North, stemming from the debt crisis of the 1980s, developing 
countries in Africa have become seriously vulnerable to develop-
ing-country pressure. The EU thus effectively advanced shallow 
integration by the ACP region. Although not always preferred, 
the ACP states were left little choice but to accept most EU 
propositions. Many similarities exist with the trade and aid 
relationship which South Africa has developed with its African 
partners.  
 
South African trade liberalisation after apartheid  
After South Africa’s first free elections in 1994, the newly 
formed government faced important decisions regarding reshap-
ing its economy. The apartheid regime had introduced a system 
of import substitution industrialisation under which South 
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African industries were protected by high tariff structures.44 
Exclusion from several Preferential Trade Agreements and inter-
national trade sanctions stemming from global anti-apartheid 
policies led to the need to do so.45 After 1994, when South Africa 
was released from the apartheid-era trade restrictions, the new 
government had to redefine its future trading relations. Choosing 
a policy that was closer to free trade or one that favoured protec-
tionism became the main topic of debate.46  
Since that time, South Africa – with the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) as its prime driving force – has clearly opted 
for a trade policy with liberalisation influences.47 To promote its 
integration in the global economy, from which it had long been 
ostracised, the DTI considered scaling down South Africa’s high 
trade barriers as a priority. In 1996 the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy was thus launched. GEAR is an 
export-oriented macro-economic programme that has tariff 
liberalisation as one of its main objectives.48 South Africa 
actively pursues the implementation of WTO trade rules and it 
has been said to execute these even faster than is required.49 The 
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) that 
was concluded with the European Union in 1999 serves as a good 
example of South Africa’s efforts towards enhanced free trade.  
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The advent of a new South African government also marked a 
new beginning for enhanced African economic cooperation. In 
recent years, South African government officials have increas-
ingly travelled the continent to settle violent disputes and to forge 
stronger political and economic links in Africa. In 1998 South 
African President Thabo Mbeki gave a speech at the United 
Nations University in Tokyo entitled ‘The African Renaissance, 
South Africa and the World’,50 in which he spoke of new ambi-
tions for Africa’s development that were to be pursued through a 
communal African economic programme. This would help the 
continent to lift itself out of its position of economic exclusion 
from the rest of the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 3   South African President Thabo Mbeki and  
 President of the European Commission Jose  
 Manuel Barosso 
[Source: Audiovisual Library of the European Commission] 
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Mbeki’s ideas of an African Renaissance formed an important 
stepping stone for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD).51 This action plan, presented in 2001 and for a large 
part designed by South Africa, also aims to bolster African eco-
nomies by bringing the continent into the world trading system 
and the global economy.52 The main areas that NEPAD focuses 
on are peace and security, democracy and governance, economic 
and corporate governance, human resource development, infra-
structure and the diversification of production and exports.53 
Economic models closely related to neo-liberalism are consid-
ered to form the basis of these ambitions.54  
During the 1980s, similar programmes to revitalise Africa’s 
economy focused mainly on extensive forms of collective self-
reliance. NEPAD, however, sees the solution for Africa’s pro-
blems in a market model with high levels of free trade at its core. 
The globalisation of the world economy is considered to have 
made it both possible and necessary to integrate further into the 
global economy.55  
The renewed western development strategies of open trade and 
further economic integration with the developing world have 
meant that NEPAD has received extensive political support from 
western donor countries.56 Various initiatives that the programme 
mentions correspond with EU plans to enhance economic 
development in the ACP area. Its regional integration initiatives 
clearly correlate with the EU’s goals for Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). Although many African leaders foresaw 
large potential for new financial support through NEPAD, the 
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substantial promises for larger aid packages have so far failed to 
materialise.  
There are various reasons why NEPAD envisages enhanced 
regional economic integration in Africa. Regional integration 
enlarges markets, which makes it easier to attract foreign invest-
ment. Intensified regional cooperation is also likely to improve 
the infrastructure between countries, creating a better environ-
ment for trade between African trading partners. With larger 
markets, competition increases, thus lowering production prices. 
Larger markets also allow African countries to gain political and 
economic power, rendering governments less dependent on the 
developing world. Lastly, working together on a regional basis 
decreases the chances of national and international conflicts.  
South Africa, in conjunction with a small group of other 
African states, has taken the lead in developing the NEPAD 
initiative, making it one of NEPAD’s strongest adherents.57 The 
present government is encouraging states continent-wide to 
implement NEPAD and regional integration is one of South 
Africa’s priorities within NEPAD. The regional cooperation 
agreement that it is focusing most on concerns the group it is a 
member of itself, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). In 1996 a free-trade protocol was signed between 
eleven of the SADC countries. A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
between the member states was scheduled to be established 
within a period of eight years.58 There are plans are to install a 
customs union by 2010, a common market by 2015, a monetary 
union by 2016 and a single currency by 2018.59
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 Map 1 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) area  
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Enhancing the efficiency of SADC – to which the BLNS states 
also belong – matches South Africa’s liberalisation objectives as 
well as its regional development goals. By introducing asym-
metrical free trade in the SADC region and by offering support to 
the strengthening of neighbouring economies, South Africa syn-
chronises growth throughout the region with its national growth 
objectives.60 South Africa regards support for regional 
integration as an incentive for economic development in the 
entire region, a phenomenon sometimes called developmental 
regionalism.61 It has called market integration the ‘key driver for 
development’.62 This type of development through trade shows a 
clear link with the ‘trade not aid’ philosophy.  
Enhancing regional integration directly benefits South Africa’s 
national interests. Since SADC is South Africa’s largest export 
market, lowering trade barriers through regional integration can 
be very advantageous. It enlarges South Africa’s domestic mar-
ket, giving producers greater potential for exporting to countries 
within the region.63 The SADC FTA could also lead South Africa 
to pursue trade agreements with other developed and developing 
regions. Such objectives, however, would not necessarily benefit 
the rest of the SADC members.64 Because South Africa is rela-
tively wealthier than its partners in SADC, it is better protected 
from the effects of open trade barriers than the rest of the region.  
These risks for other SADC members, as well as the 
perception that South Africa is primarily concerned with its own 
well-being, have led some to argue that South Africa’s regional 
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integration attempts are, in fact, a way of dominating the conti-
nent.65 South Africa’s GEAR strategy shows a strong preference 
for private-sector capital in the region and is supported by 
various regional integration programmes. Its relative abundance 
of corporate capital has led to fears of South Africa dominating 
regional economies.66 Meanwhile, Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes (SAPs) – agreed by the World Bank, the IMF and six of 
the fourteen SADC countries – are also promoting trade liberali-
sation throughout the region.67  
South Africa plays an influential role within the Southern 
African Customs Union. With its history of economic dominance 
in the region, South Africa has long exercised substantial control 
over SACU trade policies.68 Since the end of apartheid, the South 
African government has pushed for trade liberalisation in the 
entire SACU area.69
South Africa’s economic power in comparison with its re-
gional partners enables it to have extensive influence over the 
region’s economic policies. This is irrespective of whether South 
Africa’s ideological intentions are focussed on its own national 
or on regional interests. Support from the EU further increases 
such pressure.70  
In June 2006 the EU and South Africa adopted a Strategic 
Partnership agreement that, according to the EC, would ‘move 
political relations between the EU and South Africa from regular 
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dialogue to intense strategic cooperation, as both share many 
objectives on regional, pan-African and international issues’.71 
The agreement reflected their intention to strengthen communal 
efforts in promoting economic development on the rest of the 
continent. European Development Commissioner Louis Michel 
was quoted as saying that ‘Together, we promote, for instance, 
peace, good governance and regional integration through the 
African Union. This strategic partnership between the EU and 
South Africa will allow us to work even more closely together at 
regional, continental and global levels to support Africa meet its 
development goals.’.72
Since South Africa maintains trade policies that are quite 
liberal, it regards similar liberal programmes preferable for the 
entire SADC region.73 The signing of the Trade, Development 
and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU can be seen as 
one such step in pressurising the region to enhance trade liberali-
sation.   
 
The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
The liberalisation policy that South Africa adopted after 1994, 
and which was formalised most clearly in the 1996 GEAR pro-
gramme, has importantly influenced its trade policy. One pro-
minent spin-off has been the EU–South Africa Trade, Develop-
ment and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA).  
During long stretches in the apartheid years, South Africa 
faced measures of trade discrimination by its foreign trading 
partners. Imports were boycotted internationally and embargoes 
were imposed on the trade of arms and oil. South Africa’s shift to 
                                                 
71  European Commission (2006), Commission proposes to upgrade EU’s relations 
with South Africa to a Strategic Partnership. Press release, Brussels (28 June 
2006). 
72  Locit. 
73  Tsie (2000: 17). 
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a democratically elected government in 1994 meant an end to 
these boycotts. A strong will emerged amongst European coun-
tries to support the Mandela leadership and to encourage econo-
mic growth. A new EU–South Africa trade relationship, so it was 
argued, would help the young democracy develop.74 As the EU 
was then, and still is, South Africa’s largest trading partner, 
constituting a new trade agreement with the EU was considered 
pivotal.75 Therefore, in 1995, shortly after the elections, trade 
negotiations started.  
Because both parties adhered to tariff-liberalising policies, it 
was logical that the new agreement would be based on these 
same principles. Although initially South Africa expressed its 
desire to be included in the Lomé treaty and hence be offered 
terms of non-reciprocity, it soon had to drop these intentions 
because of resistance from the EU. South Africa’s dependence on 
the economically dominant EU gave the EU sufficient leverage 
to enable the acceptance of reciprocity. Both the EU’s impor-
tance as a trading partner and the large amounts of funding it was 
to offer South Africa enhanced the conditionality norm. Reci-
procal free trade became the point of departure for the EU and 
South Africa, although both parties soon began to strive for 
various exceptions. During the four years that followed many 
changes to the original negotiation mandates were made. 
At the start of negotiations the EU had five main negotiating 
directives. The trade agreement with South Africa had to be 
WTO compatible; to cover development objectives; to respect 
the EU common policies; to be in coherence with other prefer-
ential agreements; and to take into account the impact it would 
have on the Southern African region.76  
                                                 
74  Davies (2000: 5).
75  At the beginning of the TDCA negotiations in 1996, trade with the EU consti-
tuted 44% of South Africa’s trade. See Jachia & Teljeur (1999: 21). 
76  Lowe (2000: 39-45).
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The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement was to 
have both a trade and a development component. On the trade 
side, the EU agreed to remove approximately 95 per cent of 
tariffs on South African exports. The elimination of these tariffs, 
mainly on industrial products, would develop only gradually. A 
period of ten years was foreseen, beginning from the start of the 
TDCA in the year 2000. On agricultural products, however, the 
EU insisted on a relatively strict policy. Although it did offer 
some concessions, the Common Agricultural Policy, which 
grants large subsidies to EU agricultural exporters, would still 
seriously affect South Africa’s trade in agricultural products.77 
On the South African side, approximately 86 per cent of tariffs 
were to be phased out within a maximum period of twelve years. 
Because the parties faced very different levels of development, 
the final agreement contained a structure of asymmetry and 
differentiation. The European Union was to phase out its tariffs 
sooner and to a higher extent than South Africa. 
The TDCA has opened up new trading possibilities for South 
Africa and many opportunities for trade expansion have emerged, 
especially for industrial products. This has created a more 
favourable environment for establishing new industries and for 
attracting investors who are looking for a platform to enter the 
European Union. In theory, this means that the region and SADC 
and SACU in particular also have new opportunities. However, 
disadvantages also loom. South Africa, SACU and SADC have 
now been forced to open up their economies to competitive EU 
products.  
The EU holds that the TDCA’s development component is the 
main reason for forging a trade agreement.78 It expects direct 
economic benefits from free trade for South Africa. But besides 
                                                 
77 Davies (2000: 9).
78 Lowe (2000: 42).
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free trade, the European Commission has also offered €125 
million annually to South Africa under the European Programme 
for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD). It does so in 
addition to bilateral donations made by the individual EU 
member states. Most financial support comes in the form of 
grants and loans for development programmes. This aid marks 
the assistance side of the conditionality norm and demonstrates 
what South Africa has gained in return for its policy changes. 
The asymmetrical implementation of free trade can, of course, 
also be considered as part of the development programme. 
Since the conclusion of the trade talks, much has been said 
about the contents of the EU-South Africa FTA. While both 
parties are breaking down barriers – the EU doing so more and 
faster than South Africa – critics say the influence of EU imports 
on South Africa’s market is much larger than that of South 
African imports on the EU market. They expect South Africa to 
experience its new vulnerability much more than the EU.79 
Moreover, many consider the differentiation in implementing 
reciprocity essentially unfair. Although the EU bans tariffs on 
more products, South Africa does so for more sensitive products. 
Furthermore, products excepted through the Common Agricul-
tural Policy could also continue to harm South Africa. 
The South African government realises that these economic 
changes can have detrimental effects. It, however, argues that the 
dynamic and geopolitical benefits of entering into a FTA with the 
EU outweigh the costs.80 This might not be the case for the 
countries that South Africa already holds trade agreements with 
in its own region. Because of their economic integration agree-
ment with South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swazi-
land face excessive damage from the TDCA.  
                                                 
79  Davies (2000: 10).
80  Goodison (1999: 38). 
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TDCA effects on SACU  
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is considered the 
oldest Customs Union in the world. Founded in 1910, SACU 
encompasses South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland. The SACU countries experience free trade within the 
region and maintain common tariffs for external trade. To pro-
mote the domestic production of goods inside the customs union, 
these external tariffs until recently were kept relatively high.  
One of the major concerns that critics of the Trade, Develop-
ment and Cooperation Agreement expressed during the nego-
tiations with the EU was the potential damage for Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.81 Their economic integration 
with South Africa through SACU meant that these countries are 
de facto incorporated into the TDCA. The BLNS countries 
expected various direct and indirect negative effects of the 
TDCA. The trade-related concessions that South Africa was to 
make to the EU, were considered relatively more harmful to the 
BLNS. The liberalisation of trade with the EU is a much bigger 
shift for the BLNS countries than it is for South Africa.  
The TDCA forced the BLNS states to eliminate thirty per cent 
of tariffs on products coming from the EU. Meanwhile, the non-
reciprocal Lomé trade agreement already provided them with 
very favourable arrangements for exports to the EU.82 Therefore, 
unlike South Africa, access to the EU market would not improve 
for the BLNS states.83 Lower tariffs on EU products would make 
the BLNS countries lose the ability to compete with cheaper EU 
products, especially in the highly subsidised agricultural and 
agro-processing sectors.84 Stronger competition from EU pro-
ducts could also force SACU industries to lower their prices. 
                                                 
81  Panos (1998: 15-16), Goodison (1999), Mbekeani (1999), ERO (2001). 
82  Ibid: 27. 
83  Ibid: 41. 
84  Ibid: 45. 
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That would drive investors towards foreign industries and mar-
kets with higher price levels. All this would lead to production, 
employment and income losses. Besides enhanced competition 
from the EU, South Africa – now facing the same tariffs for trade 
to the EU as the BLNS countries – potentially became a larger 
competitor as well. 
Perhaps the most substantial effect of lower tariffs was the 
expected decrease in BLNS states’ customs revenue. At the time 
of the TDCA negotiations, SACU contained a common customs 
and excise revenue pool. For levying customs no distinction was 
made between trade to South Africa or to any of the other SACU 
countries. South Africa was responsible for the collecting of 
these funds and their disbursal to the SACU members according 
to a fixed distribution code. Since in reality the majority of trade 
to the region goes to South Africa – the vast majority of BLNS 
imports come in via that country – the BLNS states have always 
been very dependent on South African trade customs.85  
The BLNS countries rely heavily on the SACU revenue pool. 
In 1998, during the negotiation process, SACU customs were 
calculated to amount to 17.1 per cent of total government reve-
nues for Botswana, 27.6 per cent for Namibia, 44.8 per cent for 
Swaziland and 41.7 per cent for Lesotho.86 The implementation 
of the TDCA was expected to result in revenue losses of between 
Rand 1.6 billion and Rand 5.7 billion per year for the whole 
SACU region.87 While for Botswana this meant a decrease of 
revenue of only 5.3 per cent, Namibia would be affected with an 
                                                 
85  Meyn (2003: 2). 
86  Mbekeani (1999: 55). By 2001 these numbers had changed to 13% for 
Botswana, 28% for Namibia and 51% for both Lesotho and Swaziland. See 
Meyn (2003: 2). 
87  Jachia & Teljeur (1999: 22). 
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8.6 per cent loss. Swaziland and Lesotho were expected to lose 
out by 13.9 and 12.9 per cent respectively.88  
To cope with these potentially severe effects, the BLNS 
countries were forced to amend their trade policies. The domestic 
tax systems were to be reformed so that the losses in customs 
revenue would be moderated. To withstand the increased com-
petition from EU and South African products, industrial enter-
prises were required to become more competitive and to develop 
new products. Strong regulatory and judicial regimes also had to 
be encouraged to attract foreign investment.89 Especially least-
developed Lesotho risked detrimental effects as a result of the 
TDCA. Although technically offered the possibility of maintain-
ing non-reciprocal treatment by the EU, SACU’s communal 
revenue collection system meant that in effect Lesotho would 
benefit minimally from its preferential LDC treatment. 
Facing these detrimental effects and having to carry out such 
drastic reforms has triggered much TDCA-related criticism 
amongst the BLNS countries. The EU and South Africa have, 
however, always claimed to have considered the BLNS states’ 
interests during TDCA negotiations. They argue that the damage 
done to the BLNS states is less serious than stated above and that 
the existing effects have been catered for properly by the imple-
mentation of safeguard clauses and compensation payments.90  
 
The new SACU agreement  
In October 2002, after seven years of negotiations, a new cus-
toms union agreement was signed between all five SACU coun-
tries. Much of the criticism by the BLNS states seemed to have 
been heard by South Africa. BLNS concerns with the effects of 
                                                 
88 Mbekeani (1999: 55). 
89  Ibid: 56. 
90  Lowe (2000: 44).
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South African regional dominance were largely met. The BLNS 
countries were given a larger revenue share, with Lesotho and 
Swaziland receiving the highest increases.91 They also gained 
greater authority in SACU’s decision-taking structure. This at-
tempt at democratisation was meant to balance South Africa’s 
economic and, therefore, decisional hegemony within SACU.92 
However, in return for these concessions the BLNS countries 
were to accept higher standards of trade liberalisation.93  
In the new SACU agreement, all members promise to strive 
for further integration into the global economy.94 This confronts 
the BLNS states with all the risks of increased competition and 
revenue losses that were mentioned earlier as coming from the 
TDCA. Besides liberalising trade towards outside parties, SACU 
members have also taken further steps towards intra-SACU 
market integration.95 Harmonising policies in various areas and 
achieving higher standards of deep integration amongst its 
members has become an important SACU objective.96 Agricul-
tural marketing regulations in SACU countries are scheduled to 
be geared to one another while on industrial matters a common 
industrial policy for the whole customs union is envisaged.97  
Many signs show that the BLNS countries have taken their 
promises seriously. They have decided to pursue higher levels of 
                                                 
91  McCarthy (2003: 625). 
92  Ibid: 621-23. 
93  Ibid: 626. 
94  Southern African Customs Union Agreement between the governments of the 
Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the 
Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland, signed October 2002. 
Gaborone: Tralac. 
95  Southern African Customs Union Agreement between the governments of the 
Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the 
Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland, signed October 2002. 
Article 2 (f). Gaborone: Tralac. 
96  Erasmus (2004). 
97  McCarthy (2003: 628). 
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trade liberalisation, both through more shallow forms of inte-
gration with the advanced industrialised countries and through 
deep integration amongst its members. In various reports and 
interviews, BLNS government officials have stated stepping up 
to an enhanced removal of tariffs on trade.98 The WTO, in its 
2003 Trade Policy Review, argues that ‘since the last Review of 
their trade policies in 1998, SACU countries have continued their 
economic reform programmes, where trade and investment 
liberalization have played key roles’.99 The same report mentions 
that SACU members ‘urge for more initiatives which will multi-
laterally liberalize trade in areas of particular interest to develop-
ing countries’.100 SACU is currently also forging a FTA with the 
United States. A FTA with the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) was concluded in 2005. SACU also signed a preferential 
trade deal with Mercosur at the end of 2004. Trade deals with 
India, China and Nigeria are expected in the near future and also 
Singapore, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Turkey have expressed 
interest in free trade with SACU.101 These activities clearly 
suggest a move by the BLNS countries towards enhanced trade 
liberalisation. Compensation payments, which the BLNS states 
were offered in return for their concessions, are the topic of dis-
cussion hereafter. 
                                                 
98  See European Research Office (2001), Irving (1999) and government of 
Lesotho (2004). 
99  WTO (2003a: vii). All SACU countries are original WTO members. Three of 
them have resident delegations in Geneva and participate actively in the WTO 
while the two other members plan to open missions in Geneva soon. 
100  WTO (2003a: x). 
101  Business Day, 3 October 2005. 
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Chapter findings 
The decision by the BLNS states to introduce a more liberal 
direction to their trade policies seems harmful and therefore may 
look somewhat out of place. However, the different forms of 
pressure that the advanced industrial states exerted explain how 
this decision originated. Within an environment of growing 
economic globalisation, in which the dominant western powers 
strongly promote trade liberalisation, developing countries have 
found it hard to maintain policies that are independent of more 
open trade. Powerful external economic and political constraints, 
first introduced by the advanced industrialised states during the 
1980s, have given the North greater bargaining power over the 
South. Besides individual countries and a trading block such as 
the EU, the WTO and international financial institutions have 
also pushed for shifts in the direction of free trade.102 The 1980’s 
debt crisis enabled these actors to provide assistance on the basis 
of policy adjustment in the developing countries, the so-called 
conditionality norm.  
The EU has pursued enhanced free trade with the developing 
world through the introduction of reciprocity under the new 
Cotonou trade agreement and the TDCA. South Africa, being the 
other partner to the TDCA and making use of the new SACU 
treaty, must be held accountable for this impact too. International 
pressure, originating largely from the EU and South Africa, has 
made it increasingly difficult for the BLNS countries to with-
stand a move towards enhanced trade liberalisation. The various 
forms of pressure, stemming mainly from economic shocks, 
expanding conditionality and changes in the multilateral trading 
system, have created this environment. The next chapter exam-
ines more specifically one such pressure instrument that has been 
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used to accomplish trade liberalisation in the BLNS countries; 
compensation payments.  
 
  
 
 
3 
Compensation payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between western pressure to liberalise and a 
shift in BLNS countries’ trade policies, as the previous chapter 
discussed, forms a background against which one such form of 
pressure can be placed. This chapter focuses on compensation 
payments. It scrutinises their presence and form, as well as the 
extent to which they have been used to promote further trade 
liberalisation.  
The first section examines generic forms of development 
assistance, as used by the EU to stimulate trade liberalisation by 
the ACP countries. There, the burgeoning of a system in which 
aid is offered in return for trade adjustment is assessed. The same 
section discusses the forms of conditionality that have existed 
since the mid-1980s. Thereafter, the chapter focuses on the EU-
South Africa TDCA. Non-financial concessions that were made 
to the BLNS states to curb the effects of the TDCA are ad-
dressed. Finally, various compensation payments that were given 
to the BLNS states by the EU and South Africa are scrutinised.  
In studying financial pressure on the BLNS states, the chapter 
focuses on three possible forms: pressure from the EU through 
49 
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ACP agreements; pressure from the EU and partly from South 
Africa through the TDCA related compensation payments; and 
pressure from South Africa through the SACU agreement. 
Assessing the compensation programmes that fit within these 
categories reveals the extent to which each of them is capable of 
carrying out the objectives for which they were officially de-
signed. 
EU-ACP conditional aid  
Historical overview 
The European Union has a long history of offering trade agree-
ments in combination with financial assistance to African coun-
tries. Currently nearly half the money spent on development 
assistance comes from the EU and its individual member states. 
Together they provide more than €30 billion worth of aid annu-
ally, which places the EU amongst the world’s biggest donors.1 
EU cooperation traditionally focuses on both economic and 
development cooperation.2 The 1963 and 1969 Yaoundé 
Conventions and since 1975 the various Lomé treaties were 
based on a strong belief that the EU had an obligation to help the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries to overcome 
their state of underdevelopment. During the 1960s and 1970s 
former colonising powers sought to replace formal colonial 
structures by trade arrangements that would maintain European 
influence in Africa.3 The principle of combining trade 
agreements with development aid stood at the centre of all these 
agreements.  
                                                 
1  EU (2004). 
2  EU (2001a). 
3  Mailafia (1997: 36). 
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The Lomé III negotiations of 1984-1985 introduced the 
concept of conditionality, albeit at a relatively low level.4 When 
in 1989 Lomé IV was signed, a stronger understanding amongst 
the donor community had emerged that financial aid and eco-
nomic support programmes were ineffective if not tied to eco-
nomic reforms. The EU encouraged countries to undertake 
structural adjustment programmes with the help of financial 
support from developed nations.5 These measures of tying aid to 
adjustment requirements reflected what Chapter Two called the 
conditionality norm. Aid recipients were encouraged to design 
policies that promoted economic integration in order to receive 
financial assistance. Under Lomé IV, special structural adjust-
ment support programmes to ACP countries were thus intro-
duced.6  
The main financial and technical instruments of the Lomé 
agreement were, and still are, within the Cotonou partnership, the 
European Development Fund and the resources of the European 
Investment Bank. These are allocated in various forms, such as 
grants and risk capital.7 Most EU aid comes in the form of non-
repayable grants.8 During the 1986-1998 period, the ACP coun-
tries received €22.8 billion from the European Development 
Fund in grants, risk capital and loans to the private sector. This 
represented 77 per cent of all EU aid to ACP countries. Sixteen 
per cent of aid to the region, or €4.9 billion, was allocated from 
the European Community budget. This mainly encompassed food 
aid and humanitarian aid (particularly in 1994 and 1995). The 
remaining seven per cent was provided from the ‘own resources’ 
of the European Investment Bank, the EU’s long-term funding 
                                                 
4  Haggard (1995: 102). 
5  Mailafia (1997: 46). 
6  Ikiara (1997). 
7  EU (2001a). 
8  EU (2004). 
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body, in the form of concessional loans.9 Most of these loans 
went to infrastructure projects and utilities.  
Under Lomé IV, funds were made available through ten 
different cooperation instruments. During the Cotonou negotia-
tion process, the EU tried to reduce this number and sought to 
introduce a new programming system. The integration of the 
different development cooperation aspects – politics, trade and 
aid – became a major objective of this new programming sys-
tem.10 Providing risk capital and loans on concessional terms 
remained an important aspect of the new aid cooperation instru-
ment.11  
 
Conditionality provisions under Cotonou 
Combining the politics, trade and aid sectors within one coop-
eration instrument, and making it a focal point of its new coop-
eration agreement has reshaped EU development assistance. 
Under the new Cotonou directives, aid has received a closer 
relationship with trade objectives.12 As the EU is focussing its 
trade relationship with the ACP region increasingly on concep-
tions of trade liberalisation and reciprocity, it is likely to base the 
nature of its development assistance on similar conceptions. 
Linking aid to policies that promote trade liberalisation implies 
enhancing the conditionality norm which started under Lomé III.  
Article 67 of the Cotonou Agreement discusses the intention to 
‘provide support for macroeconomic and sectoral reforms imple-
mented by the ACP States’. One form of development assistance 
that the EU has initiated after the conclusion of the new Cotonou 
Agreement supports the integration of the ACP states into the 
                                                 
9  ECDPM (2001a). 
10  ECDPM (2001e). 
11  ECDPM (2001b). 
12  European Commission (2002). 
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multilateral trading system of the WTO.13 Extra attention is also 
given to regional integration. Regional activities that have an 
influence on national development have received substantial 
support.14 The plans for constituting Economic Partnership 
Agreements in the ACP region seem to be of direct influence on 
the nature of EU aid. In 2002 the SADC region received €101 
million to promote regional integration. A year later Trade.Com 
was approved, which was to support the ACP countries in their 
transition towards EPA regions. A €20 million Project Manage-
ment Unit was also funded to prepare the ACP countries for the 
EPA negotiations.15 In April 2006 the European Commission 
again donated an amount of €18 million to the SADC bloc to 
modernise their customs systems and improve border posts. The 
grant intended ‘to put in place a legal and institutional framework 
for a future SADC customs union envisaged for 2010’.16  
Much of the EU funding currently goes into technical assis-
tance and capacity building. EU aid increasingly focuses on areas 
such as the restructuring of government agencies, the privatisa-
tion of public companies and the training of officials. It also 
helps to supply ACP negotiators with knowledge and skills that 
are needed in international negotiations.17 The conditionality 
norm has overtly gained much ground within EU aid disburse-
ments. 
 
TDCA-related compensation  
In Chapter Two the potential harm that South Africa’s partners 
within the Southern African Customs Union faced as a result of 
the EU-South Africa TDCA was discussed. Increased competi-
                                                 
13  European Development Fund (2003). 
14  European Commission (2000). 
15  Szepesi (2004). 
16  Mail & Guardian (2006a). 
17  European Commission (2002). 
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tion from both the EU and South Africa, combined with a drastic 
decline in revenue, formed the major threats for Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. For the EU and South Africa, 
however, adopting a free trade relationship was essential. Both 
were determined to find solutions to external impediments such 
as the concerns of the BLNS states. The newly revised – and in 
many ways trade liberalisation promoting – aid programme that 
the EU used through its agreement with the ACP met these goals 
in many ways. Donating development assistance in the form of 
adaptation schemes to WTO standards, but also supplying money 
for regional integration, strongly encouraged the objectives of 
deeper integration within the SACU region. It also enhanced 
shallow integration with the outside world.  
Even more effective support for creating acceptance of the 
TDCA was included in the TDCA itself. These forms of support 
were related more directly to the BLNS states’ concerns with the 
agreement. Various non-financial adjustments to the TDCA were 
made to comply with BLNS complaints about their economic 
well-being. For example, a special mention of the BLNS coun-
tries was included in the safeguard clause of the agreement. 
These safeguard clauses ensure that if any product is imported in 
quantities and under conditions that would threaten to cause 
serious injury to BLNS states’ producers, appropriate measures 
may be taken.  
Sensitive products such as beef and sugar were already 
excluded on the South African side of the agreement. The ‘full 
cumulative’ provision was included in the rules of origin of the 
TDCA to protect the industries of the BLNS countries. This 
allowed South Africa to export goods produced in the other 
SACU countries as ‘South African’ if the final stage of process-
ing was undertaken in South Africa. Finally, the possibility of 
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special EU assistance to the BLNS states under the cooperation 
programme with South Africa was mentioned in the TDCA.18  
 
TDCA-related financial compensation 
Besides the various trade adjustments that were made in the final 
draft of the TDCA, the BLNS states also requested assistance 
outside the agreement to curb the detrimental TDCA effects. The 
decline in revenue was particularly alarming and needed to be 
dealt with. To keep government income at a stable level, ad-
dressing fiscal reform was urgent. Introducing new taxes, such as 
a system of Value Added Tax (VAT) and strengthening existing 
tax collections were considered priorities. At the same time, 
public expenditure needed to be restricted by accelerating com-
mercialisation and privatisation reform in BLNS countries.19 
While these reforms were costly, they were regarded as symp-
toms that the BLNS states had not themselves created. The EU 
was therefore seen as the actor that should supply appropriate 
funding. 
In an interview conducted for this study, South African Mem-
ber of Parliament and Chair of the Parliament’s Trade and 
Industry Committee, Rob Davies, mentions that at the time of the 
TDCA negotiations the BLNS states’ concerns led to a political 
conflict.20 A SACU liaison group, representing Members of 
Parliament from all SACU countries, clashed with the EU on the 
need for compensation to the BLNS states. In spite of consider-
able pressure by the liaison group, the EU refused to acknowl-
edge that the TDCA’s adverse effects on the BLNS countries 
were serious enough to merit compensation. According to 
                                                 
18  Lowe (2000: 44).
19  Bank of Namibia Research Department (2002: 14). 
20  Telephonic interview with Rob Davies, member of parliament and chair of the 
South African parliament’s trade and industry committee, Johannesburg, June 
2004. 
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Davies, ideological reasons for introducing reciprocal free trade 
with the SACU region prevented the EU from acknowledging the 
negative effects of the TDCA. Since the FTA with the SACU 
region was to function as a precedent for the rest of the ACP, this 
acknowledgement would have had serious implications for future 
EPA negotiations.21  
While the BLNS countries insisted on being compensated and 
the EU refused to acknowledge the adverse TDCA effects, the 
EU found alternative ways to create BLNS acceptance. Davies 
mentions that the BLNS states were offered various adjustment 
payments by the EU within the framework of existing and new 
aid programmes. Because this aid is not earmarked as compensa-
tion, it does not force the EU to acknowledge any damage from 
the TDCA that could set a precedent for the rest of the ACP 
region.22 However, since the aid is directly related to curbing the 
TDCA effects, the nature of these payments is in reality similar 
to fully fledged compensation payments. Various TDCA-related 
adjustment programmes appear to exist. 
 
The Economic Integration Support Programme to the BLNS  
In 2000 the EU launched its Economic Integration Support 
Programme to the BLNS. This three-year, €6 million programme 
aims to help support the BLNS countries benefit from the EU-
South Africa FTA.23 More specifically, the programme seeks to 
assist the BLNS countries adapt trade and trade-related policies 
and restructure their means of revenue collection. It also supports 
private-sector development in the BLNS countries and encour-
ages them to take advantage of the TDCA.24 By providing 
technical assistance, equipment and resources, the institutional 
                                                 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  European Research Office (2002b: 16). 
24  See European Union in South Africa. 
 
57 
frameworks and the human capacity of the BLNS states are thus 
developed. 
The Economic Integration Support Programme (EISP) has 
been divided into three phases. Phase One consists of preparatory 
work and an analysis of adjustment issues arising from trade 
liberalisation. Phase Two includes the designing of appropriate 
transitional budgetary support programmes. It also aims to assist 
the private sector in enhancing competitiveness. Phase Three in-
cludes the financing of the transitional budgetary support pro-
grammes.25  
 
Reception of the EISP 
Since its launch, the Economic Integration Support Programme 
has received substantial criticism from BLNS governments and 
NGOs. Various arguments have been used in formulating this 
critique.   
The BLNS states consider the EISP to be insufficiently 
targeted at the individual problems of the separate countries. The 
programme plans to base a Project Management Unit at the 
Swaziland Ministry of Finance, from which the programme will 
be conducted. However, the BLNS countries fear that this 
Management Unit will not properly cater for their individual 
concerns.26 They argue that problems are addressed more effec-
tively when using staff that are familiar with country-specific 
issues on the impact of the EU-South Africa TDCA. By requiring 
personnel to work with governments and the private sector in 
separate BLNS countries, concrete initiatives should develop 
more efficiently.27
                                                 
25  European Research Office (2004a). 
26  In June 2004 the EISP was redesigned. The new Project Management Unit is 
now likely to be located in Namibia. 
27  European Research Office (2001: 22). 
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Since all transitional budgetary support measures will be 
prepared within the framework applicable to the EU’s Structural 
Adjustment Support Programmes, some worry that only Lesotho 
will be able to claim this aid.28 There would be a problem for 
Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland to receive funding under the 
present EISP structures. The EC is thought to be reluctant to 
sufficiently cushion the impact of free trade on government 
revenues in non-LDCs. Some believe it fears the precedent this 
might set in the context of wider ACP-EU trade negotiations.29  
Complaints about the EU downplaying the scale of future 
revenue losses have been voiced from the onset.30 Financial 
differences exist between EU programmes that focus on eco-
nomic development in individual BLNS countries. The so-called 
EU-Lesotho Co-operation Agreement and Financing Programme 
for the Period 2002-2007 is granting €110 million to Lesotho 
alone. Meanwhile, the EISP plans to use €6 million for a three-
year programme that has the enormous task of both revising trade 
policies and a revenue collection system and supporting private-
sector development in four different countries. This programme 
thus seems heavily underfunded when one considers that Swazi-
land’s revenue losses, resulting from enhanced free trade with the 
EU, are estimated at seven times the annual EU aid budget to the 
country.31  
In an interview, Eva Bursvik, Trade and Regional Integration 
Officer at the EC delegation in Namibia, challenged the argu-
ment of insufficient funding for the EISP. Bursvik mentioned 
that ‘the problem is [not] that too little funds have been allocated 
to this support […] given that virtually no funds have been util-
                                                 
28  European Research Office (2002b: 24). 
29  Ibid. 
30  Goodison (1999: 85). 
31  European Research Office (2002a). 
 
59 
ized under this programme to date’.32 According to her, the main 
problem has instead been ‘to spend/invest the funds wisely and 
effectively’. She argues that ‘It is difficult to identify the needs, 
design a programme to assist, find the right people to manage it 
and provide TA (technical assistance), and for the cooperating 
partner to absorb and make use of the support’. However, these 
difficulties enhance the perception that the EISP has been poorly 
designed. 
Moreover, the €6 million designated for this project do not 
seem to be extra aid for the BLNS countries. Half of this amount 
comes from the intra-ACP facility, which has similar objec-
tives.33 The other €3 million are to come from the European 
Programme for Reconstruction and Development in South Africa 
(EPRD). The EU has been said to shift the burden of most 
adjustment costs for the BLNS states to South Africa.34 This 
might not affect the outcome of the programme itself but it could 
affect the donation of alternative South African support for 
BLNS adjustment.  
Another important aspect of the EISP that has received sub-
stantial criticism is the term in which it has been offered. As 
mentioned earlier, restructuring trade policies, revenue collection 
and enhancing private-sector development is relatively ambitious 
for a three-year timeframe. Five years after its launch, the EISP 
was still not operational due to fundamental flaws in the design 
of the project.35 Some have raised the question about how 
successful reform and the building of new fiscal capacity can be 
measured. They wonder what will be done if, after the prescribed 
                                                 
32  Questions answered electronically by Eva Bursvik, trade and regional inte-
gration officer at the EC delegation in Namibia. Windhoek, Tokyo (November 
2004). 
33  See European Union in South Africa. 
34  Goodison (1999: 86). 
35  European Research Office (2002b: 24). 
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term of three years, its capacity remains low.36 The amount of 
criticism the EISP is receiving makes any continuation in the 
case of failure unlikely.37 There have been requests for the EU to 
make firm and binding commitments to support the process of 
fiscal restructuring not only in the short but also in the medium 
and long term.38  
Finally, one other controversial feature of the programme has 
been the issue of linkage. Since South Africa and the BLNS 
countries together form a customs union, they have certain obli-
gations to one another. When any of the SACU partners pursues 
an economic agreement with an outside party, approval is 
required from all the other parties in the customs union. South 
Africa needs the BLNS states’ agreement to implement its TDCA 
with the EU. The EU has therefore made the disbursal of EISP 
funds conditional on the formal agreement of the BLNS states 
with the TDCA.39  
As was mentioned in the introduction, tying payments to free 
trade acceptance does not necessarily render the EISP a less-
effective programme. It is in line with the conditionality norm, 
which the EU has increasingly adhered to since Lomé III. The 
EU considers the economic integration objectives of the TDCA a 
necessity for the BLNS countries. Offering development assis-
tance through the EISP would be senseless without acceptance of 
that programme. However, if a second-order commitment to 
targeted adjustment measures is absent, the goals of the EISP 
change. The programme’s lack of effectiveness, as described 
above, casts doubt as to whether policy adjustment served as the 
prime motive underlying this linkage.  
                                                 
36  In a 2005 overhaul of the EISP, the timeframe was extended to five years, pro-
vided that a mid-term review showed sufficient progress. 
37  ECDPM (2000).
38  European Research Office (2003c: 8). 
39  European Research Office (2001: 22). 
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With the signing of the new SACU agreement in 2002, the 
issue of BLNS countries’ acceptance of the TDCA came to a 
conclusion. In the new treaty all parties agreed that ‘No Member 
State shall negotiate and enter into new preferential trade agree-
ments with third parties or amend existing agreements without 
the consent of other Member States’. With the last part of this 
sentence the TDCA became de facto accepted by the BLNS 
states.40 Although this ratification has in a way made the linkage 
issue of the EISP redundant, the observed EU intentions at the 
time of the EISP launch in 2000 still help to determine the main 
objectives of compensation payments. 
The EISP lacks specific targeting, sufficient resources and a 
realistic timeframe. This is seriously affecting its effectiveness in 
seeking to adjust BLNS trade-policy structures to the TDCA. The 
linkage factor, in combination with poor targeting standards, 
suggests that EU concerns with TDCA acceptance might limit 
concerns for efficient adjustment.  
After remaining idle for five years, the EISP was relaunched in 
January 2005. The programme was expanded by including the 
enhancement of SACU’s regional integration agenda and the 
strengthening of the SACU secretariat’s capacities.41 The new 
EISP has redirected the management of its projects to the SACU 
secretariat, with activities and interventions suggested through 
National Bodies and Technical Liaison Committees. The actual 
implementation of activities is executed by these Technical 
Liaison Committees, by National Bodies, Member States’ 
governments and possibly the private sector. These changes 
clearly tackle an important part of the aforementioned targeting 
problems. However, they leave untouched the effects of the 
                                                 
40  Questions answered electronically by Aloys Lorkeers, resident adviser to the 
EC delegation in Swaziland. Johannesburg (June 2004). 
41  Namibian (2005). 
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initial EISP at the time of its launch in 2000. Its initial design still 
reflects the EU’s previous intentions. Also, the newly added 
regional integration as well as the SACU secretariat support 
targets render the size of the programme increasingly insufficient 
to achieve all its goals.  
 
Other compensation 
Besides adaptation programmes such as the EISP, other forms of 
financial support to the affected BLNS countries have in the past 
also been disbursed.42 In September 1999 the European Commis-
sion’s Director-General for Development, Philip Lowe, promised 
to secure funds to cushion the negative impact of the EU-South 
Africa FTA.43 Although the EU made a commitment to supply 
this accidental funding, it gave no guarantee that it would con-
tinue such contributions to BLNS countries on an annual basis.44  
Several months before Lowe made his promises, in May 1999, 
the EU had already granted €1.2 million to Swaziland under its 
eighth EDF programme for Swaziland. The aim of this funding 
was the ‘strengthening of Government of Swaziland capacity in 
trade policy analysis, external trade relations and trade promo-
tion’.45 In an interview with the Resident Adviser to the EC dele-
gation in Swaziland, Aloys Lorkeers, these payments were said 
to have been ‘programmed well ahead, and independent from 
whether a TDCA would be agreed or not’.46 According to Lor-
keers this assistance was not directly related to the TDCA and 
not intended to facilitate the acceptance of the TDCA by Swazi-
land. However, at the time of disbursal the EU did mention that 
                                                 
42  Goodison (1999: 84), European Research Office (2002b: 24). 
43  Namibian (1999a). 
44  Locit. 
45  Questions answered electronically by Aloys Lorkeers, resident adviser to the 
EC delegation in Swaziland. Johannesburg (June 2004). 
46  Locit. 
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this money was meant ‘to help Swaziland cope with any fall-out 
or effects from the South Africa-EU free trade agreement’.47  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 4   Prime Minister of Swaziland Themba Dlamini  
 and European Commissioner for Development  
 Louis Michel, 22 November 2005 
[Source: Audiovisual Library of the European Commission] 
 
 
In September 2000 the European Union awarded Swaziland a 
5.6 million euro grant to help the government reform its revenue 
collection system. One of the main objectives was to reduce 
Swaziland’s dependency on trade-related taxation.48 In the light 
of Swaziland’s expected loss of revenue at that stage, resulting 
from the EU-South Africa FTA, the payments can hardly be seen 
as being independent of the TDCA. Although this adjustment 
fund as well as the €1.2 million fund might not have been 
directly tied to TDCA acceptance, they have almost certainly 
                                                 
47  Irving (1999: 1). 
48  ANC (2000). 
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facilitated the acceptance of the agreement by BLNS states. Both 
programmes support Rob Davies’s statement that to cushion the 
TDCA effects, adjustment payments under existing aid pro-
grammes instead of TDCA-related budgetary compensation 
payments were implemented. This prevented the creation of a 
precedent for other regions. 
Similar aid disbursals as for Swaziland can be found for 
Lesotho and Botswana. In the Country Strategy Paper and 
Indicative Programme for the Period 2001-2007 between the EU 
and Lesotho, attention is drawn to ‘the possible impact that the 
TDCA will have on the customs revenues received through 
SACU’. It then continues by arguing that: ‘In this regard [i.e. the 
TDCA impact], the proposed EC support for the development of 
institutions with a medium and long-term policy planning capac-
ity and the strengthening of Lesotho’s analysis and negotiating 
capacity in trade related issues, particularly for the envisaged 
Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPA) with the 
EU, will be important’.49 This excerpt indicates that EU support 
has been disbursed to Lesotho for the direct purpose of curbing 
the negative TDCA effects.  
Under the eighth EDF just over €2 million have been allocated 
to Lesotho’s Department of Economic Cooperation and its 
Department of Economic Policy. This money has been spent on 
Advisor, Economic Planning and Budget Support.50 All benefici-
aries correlate with the aims of cushioning TDCA-related effects. 
This counters a claim by the head of the EC delegation in 
Lesotho, Daniel Aristi, that no payments have been made to help 
cushion the impact of the TDCA on Lesotho.51  
                                                 
49  Kingdom of Lesotho & the European Community (2000: 12). 
50  Ibid: 38. 
51  Although it does not necessarily imply that the entire amount was meant to 
compensate for the TDCA. 
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Within EU-Botswana relations TDCA-related aid has also 
been granted. As with Swaziland, EDF funds to Botswana have 
supported a process of fiscal reform too. The European Commis-
sion has used three separate EDF projects to provide long-term 
tax-related technical expertise, short-term consultancy, training 
and minor equipment.52 The money associated with these exer-
cises amounts to almost €800,000.53
All the aforementioned payments to Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Botswana have been launched within the framework of adjust-
ment programmes and therefore reflect a form of 
conditionality.54 In a September 2002 EC report on trade and 
development, the Commission stated that the EU ‘has experience 
with assisting the fiscal adjustment process in the form of 
advisory services and training’.55 However, it continues by 
mentioning that it has done so ‘also in the form of temporary 
budget support to contribute to covering transitional shortfalls 
(for example in West Africa and in Eastern and Southern 
Africa)’. This suggests the existence of yet another form of 
compensation: budgetary support.  
 
Budgetary support 
Under the EISP, a commitment for additional budgetary support 
was made to Lesotho.56 Responding to this issue, Daniel Aristi, 
Head of the EC delegation in Lesotho, mentions that these funds 
                                                 
52  Republic of Botswana, European Community (2003: 21). 
53  Ibid: 53. 
54  Interestingly, the recent SACU-US free trade negotiations showed similar 
occurrences of adjustment assistance. When SACU asked compensation for 
expected losses in revenue income resulting from a FTA with the US, its call 
was turned down. Instead, the US offered US$2 million for capacity-building 
support. See Telephonic interview with Peter Draper, research fellow with the 
development through trade project at the South African Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (SAIIA). Pretoria/Leiden (August 2004). 
55  Commission of the European Communities (2002: 23). 
56  European Research Office (2004a: 6). 
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have in fact not been allocated.57 This does not necessarily render 
these payments less important. The initial plans for budgetary 
support still reflect the EU’s intentions. However, similar com-
mitments were also made outside the EISP, stating that where 
enhanced free trade with the EU created fiscal difficulties, LDCs 
would be eligible for additional budgetary support.58 Cancellation 
of the EISP payments does not seem to have been due to a change 
in aid directives. The same 2002 EC report on trade and develop-
ment states that ‘to facilitate the adjustment process resulting from 
multilateral and regional trade agreements, the Commission intends 
to continue and extend this kind of [budgetary] support’.59
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 5   Former President of the European Commission  
 Romano Prodi and Botswana President Festus  
 Mogae 
[Source: Audiovisual Library of the European Commission] 
 
                                                 
57  Questions answered electronically by Daniel Aristi, acting head of the EC 
delegation in Lesotho. Johannesburg (June 2004). 
58  European Research Office (2003b: 7). 
59  Commission of the European Communities (2002: 23). 
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From the mid-1980s onwards, the EU has increasingly applied 
measures of conditionality to its financial assistance to Sub-
Saharan Africa. All the above-mentioned aid flows were set up to 
facilitate higher standards of trade liberalisation in the BLNS 
states. The Economic Integration Support Programme to the 
BLNS, the adjustment funds for Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Botswana under the eighth EDF and the budgetary support for 
Lesotho were initiated to offer the BLNS states compensation for 
their enhanced integration in the global economy. 
South African aid to the BLNS states 
South Africa has only been in the position to offer development 
assistance to the wider SADC region since its move to democ-
racy in 1994. SADC’s forerunner, the Southern African Devel-
opment Coordination Conference (SADCC), was formed in 1980 
with the purpose of being a direct opponent of the South African 
apartheid regime. It pursued larger regional independence from, 
and the isolation of South Africa.60 Logically, the SADC coun-
tries accepted almost no development assistance from South 
Africa. When international sanctions were dropped after 1994, 
South Africa quickly developed into a strong regional player. 
Actively interfering with the economic development of sur-
rounding countries had become much easier. As previous sec-
tions explained, South Africa has since encouraged the imple-
mentation of trade liberalisation continent-wide. It has used 
regional integration schemes, amongst others, as a means to 
accomplish this. 
As opposed to its relationship with most SADC countries, 
South Africa had provided its SACU partners with development 
                                                 
60  Gelb (2001: 11). 
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assistance from long before the end of apartheid. Most of these 
payments were compensatory in nature. 
Prior to the new 2002 SACU agreement, the BLNS countries 
had felt that South Africa benefited disproportionately from the 
customs union agreement. During the apartheid era, South Africa 
had always been in the position to set the communal tariff and 
excise duties, which it did in such a way as to meet its own goals 
of industrial development. As a result, the BLNS states lost fiscal 
autonomy and experienced restricted sovereignty over trade and 
industrial policy. In many cases they were forced to pay higher 
prices for goods imported from outside the union.61 Moreover, 
the BLNS states until 1994 regarded the political damage caused 
by close ties with an internationally ostracised nation as justifi-
cation for being compensated. 
 
The 2002 SACU renewal: BLNS states’ concerns for TDCA 
Under the 1969 SACU agreement, South Africa promised to 
make certain concessions that would balance its relationship with 
the BLNS states. Since South Africa was highly dependent on 
SACU for cheap resources and the export of continuous flows of 
its products to the BLNS states, it offered various forms of com-
pensation.62 The most important was the customs revenue alloca-
tion system, which assured BLNS governments of a guaranteed 
minimum in customs revenues. 
In 1994, partly because of South Africa’s complaints that the 
revenue-sharing system was becoming unaffordable, the negotia-
tions for a new SACU agreement were initiated.63 The treaty that 
was eventually signed in 2002 showed a structure in which the 
majority of the communal revenue earnings would be divided 
                                                 
61  McCarthy (2003: 615-16). 
62  Gibb (1997: 73). 
63  Ibid: 80. 
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amongst the SACU members in the form of a customs, an excise 
and a development component. The latter component, to which 
South Africa is the only net contributor, was established to 
protect Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland in particular against the 
adverse effects stemming from bilateral and multilateral trade 
liberalisation.64 The free-trade agreement between South Africa 
and the European Union must be regarded as the main example 
of such liberalisation.  
Rob Davies mentions that similar mechanisms cushioning the 
BLNS states from the polarising effects of being in a customs 
union with South Africa already existed in the previous SACU 
treaties. However, he says, these payments’ rationale has shifted 
with the new SACU agreement. Davies argues that, instead of 
curbing trade liberalisation within the SACU region, the aim of the 
development component is now to help the BLNS states in dealing 
with trade liberalisation with outside partners.65 Others have come 
to similar conclusions.66
The development component of the new treaty was initially set 
at 15 per cent of all revenue coming in through the total SACU 
excise pool. Since this part of the agreement will only ‘be 
reviewed from time to time and will be adjusted if agreed to by 
all Member States’ the percentage and its disbursal seem some-
what arbitrary and open-ended.67 No mention is made in the 
agreement of the conditions attached to the allocation of the 
funds. Unlike the EISP, a policy adjustment programme has not 
                                                 
64  McCarthy (2003: 626-27), Kirk & Stern (2003: 15). 
65  Telephonic interview with Rob Davies, member of parliament and chair of the 
South African parliament’s trade and industry committee. Johannesburg (June 
2004). 
66  Kirk & Stern (2003: 14-15). 
67 Southern African Customs Union Agreement between the governments of the 
Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the 
Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland, signed October 2002, 
Annex A: Revenue sharing formula. Gaborone: Tralac. 
 
70 
been scheduled to direct these funds.68 Both the terms and the 
targeting of the development component are therefore 
unspecified. Adjusting BLNS states’ trade policies to higher 
levels of economic integration is difficult within this framework.  
The development component was set up to curb the negative 
effects from bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. It is 
highly unlikely that this funding would have been disbursed 
without the BLNS states’ approval of the most important liberali-
sation initiative in the region, the TDCA. After all, had the 
TDCA not been ratified, hardly any reason would have existed for 
cushioning the BLNS states against trade liberalisation. It is there-
fore reasonable to assume that, during the SACU negotiations, the 
South-Africa-funded development component was linked to the 
BLNS states’ acceptance of the TDCA. Eventually, the chapter of 
the SACU agreement that deals with third party involvement 
created de facto acceptance of the EU-South Africa FTA.69
Just as the EISP and the various alternative TDCA-related 
payments by the EU, the development component of the new 
SACU agreement aims to cushion any adverse effects of the 
TDCA. Whereas the EISP speaks of specific targets and of a 
specific term, the funding of the new SACU agreement lacks 
these criteria. The SACU agreement also linked its payments to 
TDCA ratification without requiring specific targeting.  
Besides support through the SACU development component, 
South Africa has also promised to help the EU in assisting the 
BLNS states deal with the TDCA. Within the EU-South Africa 
FTA it was agreed that South Africa would provide adjustment 
assistance for its neighbouring states.70 The main effect of this 
has been the Economic Integration Support Programme that was 
                                                 
68  Kirk & Stern (2003: 10). 
69  Questions answered electronically by Aloys Lorkeers, resident adviser to the 
EC delegation in Swaziland. Johannesburg (June 2004). 
70  Eurostep (2000). 
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set up in cooperation with the EU. As mentioned earlier, South 
Africa was to provide half of the amount that was assigned for 
this project. Indirectly, however, these funds come from the EU 
through its Programme for Reconstruction and Development for 
South Africa. In the year 2000 South Africa and the EU also 
agreed within their Multi-Annual Indicative Programme that 
enhanced cooperation and integration with the SACU region was 
one of the main indicators of European support to South Africa.71  
Chapter findings 
In Chapter Three it was argued that the BLNS states are moving 
towards higher standards of free trade as a result of EU and 
South African pressure. Reciprocity through the Cotonou Agree-
ment and de facto free trade through the TDCA have been the 
EU’s tools to accomplish this. South Africa has stimulated 
further trade liberalisation in the BLNS countries with the help of 
the TDCA and the new SACU agreement. The implementation of 
these programmes has created higher levels of trade liberalisation 
in the BLNS states.  
The current chapter has demonstrated that there is a connection 
between aid and economic adjustments in the ACP area. Finan-
cial compensation, a specific form of the pressure that Chapter 
Two addressed, has importantly influenced the acceptance of the 
TDCA by the BLNS states. The EU has offered compensation 
through the ACP agreements, the TDCA, the EISP and the eighth 
EDF. South Africa has provided similar funding through the 
EISP and the SACU development component.  
The shift towards trade liberalisation that Chapter Two as-
sessed can now be put into better perspective. The conditionality 
                                                 
71  Government of the Republic of South Africa & The European Commission 
(2000: 15). 
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norm that emerged in the 1980s under Lomé III gained further 
support under Lomé IV and eventually became essential with the 
signing of the new Cotonou Agreement in 2000. This condition-
ality norm has recently also been used for the BLNS states. 
Compensation payments are leading the BLNS countries to ad-
just their economies to enhanced free trade with the EU. The 
tying of the EISP – and arguably the SACU agreement – to 
TDCA acceptance has acted as a stimulus for the BLNS coun-
tries to accept further reciprocity.  
In assessing the workings of these four compensation pro-
grammes, most have turned out to be incapable of reaching their 
official objectives. Of the EISP, the eighth EDF, the budgetary 
support payments and the SACU development component, some 
have offered money while failing to install effective elements of 
economic adjustment. This raises the question as to whether the 
EU’s and South Africa’s priorities do in fact lie with the full 
adjustment of BLNS states’ economic policies. The following 
chapter uses this programme analysis and compares the design of 
all four compensation programmes to both an economic adjust-
ment and a political acceptance model.  
 
 
  
 
 
4 
The aims of compensation: 
Economic integration vs. 
political acceptance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two opposing views can be discerned to determine the rela-
tionship between the introduction of trade liberalisation and 
financial compensation in dealings between the BLNS countries 
and the EU and South Africa. If compensation payments sup-
ported economic adjustment, the point at which adjustment aid 
was offered would be of a temporary and well-defined nature. 
Payments should also be targeted at removing the economic 
impediments to trade liberalisation. The size of compensation 
would ideally be based on exact economic studies of what is 
necessary to achieve trade liberalisation. Tying the disbursement 
of compensation payments to political concurrence with a trade 
policy shift would not be possible without a second order 
commitment to proper targeting.  
Compensatory aid programmes could also be aimed at build-
ing political support for trade liberalisation. Financial support for 
73 
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policy changes would then be fixed to a term that was either too 
short or open-ended. In similar ways, compensation would have 
to be targeted not so much at the sectors of an economy that were 
damaged by trade liberalisation but at the demands of people, 
who are, after all, the most important to creating political 
acceptance. Also, the amount of money which is offered should 
be based on a political rather than an economic study of what is 
needed to achieve free trade. Compensation payments within 
these objectives are tied to the acceptance of free trade without 
including a commitment to targeted adjustment measures. 
This chapter seeks to determine which model each of the com-
pensation programmes encountered best correspond with. The 
outcome of this assessment has important consequences for the 
relationship between trade and aid in the case of the EU, South 
Africa and the BLNS states as well as for development objectives 
in the Southern African region.  
It is possible that one programme, or parts of it, may corre-
spond with an economic adjustment model, while others corre-
spond with a political acceptance model. The four above-men-
tioned criteria help determine how these models interrelate and 
what possible combinations mean for the workings of each pay-
ment. And finally, this chapter examines the aims of compensa-
tion from a realism and a liberalism perspective. It assesses 
which of these two theories the compensation payments and their 
main objectives correspond with.  
Objectives of BLNS compensation 
The EISP  
The first form of TDCA-related compensation payments that 
Chapter Three discussed concern the Economic Integration Sup-
port Programme to the BLNS. If viewed in terms of economic 
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adjustment, the EISP should cater for the economic transition to 
free trade. As mentioned earlier, the initial EISP should be seen 
as being independent from the EISP that was redesigned in 2005. 
The first design still reflects the EU’s intentions at the time when 
the TDCA was not yet officially accepted by the BLNS states. 
The EISP shows a demarcated term of three years, sub-divided 
into three well-defined stages. After these three years, the adjust-
ment mechanisms are meant to create swift policy adjustments. 
Secondly, the aim of providing technical assistance, equipment 
and resources – and the plans to do so one at a time in distinct 
phases – indicates a specifically designed and carefully targeted 
approach. All these facets are likely to stimulate economic changes 
that ease a move towards free trade. 
If the EISP is regarded otherwise, its objective should be to 
create political acceptance for the TDCA amongst the BLNS 
states. Little seems to affect that perception. The €6 million that 
were invested in technical assistance, equipment and resources to 
develop institutional frameworks and human capacity can also 
serve a second aim, namely to create political adherence. Adjust-
ment aims and the aim of creating political support are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive. However, the economic returns of 
these investments matter less within a political acceptance model.  
Chapter Three discussed elements of the EISP which do not 
always fit the economic adjustment presumptions. They do, how-
ever, fit the political acceptance model. The EISP’s three-year 
term proved too short for its high ambitions. The programme’s 
targeting proved ineffective because of a centralised rather than 
locally directed structure. The amount of €6 million was too low 
in view of its many goals and cast doubt on whether the EISP 
was designed on the basis of how much was in fact needed for 
economic adjustment. Together, these elements make the EISP 
ineffective in adjusting the BLNS states’ trade policy structures 
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to the TDCA. Although in theory the EISP seems to match some 
of the adjustment beliefs, closer assessment shows that the pro-
gramme is insufficiently effective for building transitional struc-
tures that prepare the BLNS countries for more open trade. 
Chapter Three discussed how the linkage factor and the absence 
of a second order commitment to proper targeting put the EISP’s 
intentions under pressure.  
Tying the disbursal of EISP money to TDCA agreement would 
be suitable within a political acceptance model. Linking the pro-
gramme to ratification without imposing a requirement for suffi-
cient targeting increases the chances of political acceptance for 
the TDCA. Its failure to achieve economic adjustment to free 
trade becomes understandable when TDCA concurrence proved 
to be its primary goal. Both a transition term that is too short and 
imprecise targeting matter less if the priority of the EISP lies 
with political acceptance instead of economic adjustment. A lack 
of funding is more easily understood if the programme intends 
mainly to signal EU sensitivity to the BLNS states’ concerns. The 
EISP has been presented as exactly that: a programme that assesses 
BLNS concerns and explores possible solutions. The two-year 
delay of the programme and its failure to consider possible prob-
lems beyond the three-year period also support the interpretation 
that a short-term signal rather than a long-term adjustment aim is 
most important.1  
The EISP may in fact have mitigated initial concerns about the 
TDCA effects to create sufficient goodwill for TDCA acceptance 
at the 2002 SACU renewal. That the EU was predominantly 
interested in taking away political concerns is further supported 
by the fact that it did not propose the EISP of its own initiative. It 
                                                 
1  The redesigned EISP has a five-year timeframe, and a mid-term review. 
However for the purpose of this study, the design of the initial EISP is more 
relevant. 
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merely reacted to a strong call by BLNS governments to set up 
the programme.2
The interpretation of the EISP functioning as a ‘sweetener’ and 
aiming to build political support instead of economic adjustment 
thus gains credibility. Naturally, this does not rule out the pres-
ence of all economic adjustment objectives. Despite its discussed 
ineffectiveness, the EISP has been revised and new structures for 
effective BLNS states’ adjustment will possibly emerge. How-
ever, looking at the initial design of the programme, political 
acceptance goals help to understand important parts of the EISP 
at moments when an economic adjustment model seems less 
capable of doing so.  
 
The eighth European Development Fund  
Chapter Three also looked at adjustment payments to Swaziland, 
Lesotho and Botswana which were disbursed under the eighth 
European Development Fund. As these payments were directed 
towards the economic areas that the TDCA affected most, a 
relationship with that agreement was indicated. Both the 2002 
EC report and the statement by Rob Davies that such EDF funds 
were in fact disguised compensation payments further linked the 
origins of this compensation to the TDCA.3 The relationship 
between EDF aid and trade liberalisation again brings to the fore 
the debate between the economic adjustment and the political 
acceptance interpretation.  
At least one important point of criticism that was mentioned 
for the EISP seems not to hold for the eighth EDF payments. 
Whilst the EISP insufficiently addressed individual BLNS states’ 
                                                 
2  Personal interview with anonymous representative of the EC in South Africa. 
Pretoria (June 2004). 
3  Telephonic interview with Rob Davies, member of parliament and chair of the 
South African parliament’s trade and industry committee. Johannesburg (June 
2004), Commission of the European Communities (2002). 
 
78 
adjustment needs because of a centralised set-up, EDF aid was 
managed at a national level. This has made it easier for the 
Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana governments to target the 
eighth EDF payments to their own problems and solutions. 
Contrary to the EISP, the EDF payments have also been divided 
into smaller, more manageable projects. 
Regarding amount, term and the issue of tying, EDF support to 
Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana also differs from the EISP 
characteristics. The amount of both EDF programmes to Swazi-
land totals €6.8 million, which exceeds the total EISP budget.4 
However in this case, the entire amount has been distributed to 
one state instead of to four. The term in which the projects are 
meant to be executed is not any more strictly determined than 
that of the EISP. But, since the targeting is specified and 
manageable and since more money is involved, the timeframe, 
which for both projects is between two and three years, has also 
become more realistic. Finally, the EC representative to Swazi-
land, Aloys Lorkeers, confirmed that a tying chapter was not in-
cluded for EDF funds.5 Other available information provides no 
reason to doubt this assertion. 
Judging by its term, targeting, amount, as well as from the 
absence of linkage to TDCA acceptance, the eighth EDF pay-
ments to Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana are probably more 
effective in supporting trade policy adjustment than the EISP 
was. This does not automatically imply that the EDF funds lack the 
aim of creating political trade policy acceptance. However, since 
there seems to be a relatively high level of effectiveness, a strong 
case can be made that the economic adjustment model explains 
                                                 
4  ANC (2000), Irving (1999: 1). 
5  Questions answered electronically by Aloys Lorkeers, resident adviser to the 
EC delegation in Swaziland. Johannesburg (June 2004). 
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many aspects of these payments at least as well as a political 
acceptance model would. 
 
EU budgetary support 
In spite of various indications of TDCA-related budgetary 
support to BLNS countries, only a commitment for additional 
budgetary support to Lesotho can be traced under the EISP. But 
this aid was eventually never allocated to Lesotho. Its initial 
purpose as well as the EC directives for similar future budget 
support make it nonetheless an important aspect of TDCA-
related aid.  
The initial purpose of the budgetary payments was to cushion 
the government’s revenue shortfall which arose as a result of 
lower customs incomes. The objectives of economic adjustment 
to this new situation and those of enhancing political support 
could theoretically both be served within a certain programme.  
However, targeting within budgetary support is considerably 
vaguer then under normal programme support. Budgetary 
support payments, although normally accompanied by spending 
directives, give recipient governments greater control over their 
own policies.6 Some civil-society organisations have expressed 
concern over budget support not meeting donor objectives. They 
argue that such funding primarily accommodates the priorities of 
those in power in African countries.7 In the case of Lesotho, the 
EC temporarily suspended its budgetary support because of 
difficulties in both tracking the final destinations of 40 per cent 
of the Lesotho government budget and in properly assessing the 
impact of these funds.8
                                                 
6  Cordella & Dell’Ariccia (2003: 10), Unwin (2004: 16-17). 
7  Unwin (2004: 25). 
8  Questions answered electronically by Daniel Aristi, acting head of the EC 
delegation in Lesotho. Johannesburg (June 2004). 
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Besides targeting, a lacking term also affects economic adjust-
ment purposes. As a result of its one-off disbursal, such un-
directed assistance stands less of a chance of adding to the long-
term process of trade-policy adjustment than when funds are 
provided at different stages. Since the suspension of these pay-
ments only occurred after the approval of the TDCA, a political 
acceptance interpretation for the initial design remains relevant. 
The cancelling of this budget support makes it difficult to 
establish how much money would have been allocated to 
Lesotho. Considering that Lesotho’s estimated loss of revenue as 
a result of the TDCA amounts to 12.9 percent, on the basis of 
annual SACU-related customs of around €137 million, it can 
hardly be expected that the amount for budgetary support would 
have covered any substantial economic losses.9 Since the bud-
getary support payments were part of the EISP, the inception of 
which was dependent on TDCA concurrence, these payments 
were also tied to TDCA acceptance.  
With hardly any conditions attached and its targeting un-
specified, this money would have lacked almost any economic 
adjustment aim. Its linkage with TDCA ratification enhances the 
thought that it would mainly have been used for persuading the 
Lesotho government to accept enhanced free trade. A neo-
mercantilist or realist view, according to which the EU tries to 
buy its way into free trade, would have interpreted the nature of 
these payments much more adequately than liberalism would 
have.  
The budgetary support payments to Lesotho, regardless of 
their suspension, form a strong example of side-payments. Hold-
ing relatively weak conditions, this money lacks a convincing 
economic adjustment aim. Its linkage with TDCA ratification in 
the absence of a second order commitment to targeted adjustment 
                                                 
9  Kingdom of Lesotho & the European Community (2000: 60). 
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measures enhances this view. It thus becomes plausible that the 
budgetary support payments were designed to encourage the 
Lesotho government in going along with enhanced free trade. A 
view in which the EU tries to secure political acceptance of free 
trade interprets the nature of these payments more adequately 
than an economic adjustment model does.  
A political acceptance approach raises questions as to why the 
other BLNS states were not mentioned in the EISP plans for 
similar aid. One argument could be that only Lesotho is con-
sidered a Least Developed Country and thus needs EU support 
more than the others. However, as mentioned earlier, Swaziland 
was expected to lose an even higher percentage of its revenue. 
This preferential treatment, which it also experienced under 
the EISP, can again be explained by a political acceptance model. 
Lesotho already had the guarantee of ongoing non-reciprocal 
trade with the EU under the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
provisions for Least Developed Countries. Unlike Botswana, 
Namibia and Swaziland, who were expected to face a move 
towards reciprocal trade in the future, Lesotho did not have to 
worry about enhanced trade liberalisation if the TDCA was to be 
repudiated. In fact, the EBA option seemed to provide Lesotho 
with even better conditions than the TDCA. Responding to 
questions on this matter, the EC head of delegation in Lesotho 
mentioned that no changes in trade volumes had occurred as a 
result of the TDCA. However, he said, there was ‘scope for 
textile exports to Europe to take off under the EBA (not the 
TDCA)’.10 Lesotho, theoretically a more persistent adversary to 
the TDCA, thus required larger compensation than the other 
BLNS countries. It is not unrealistic to regard the design of bud-
getary support to Lesotho in the light of greater financial pressure 
                                                 
10  Questions answered electronically by Daniel Aristi, acting head of the EC 
delegation in Lesotho. Johannesburg (June 2004). 
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from the side of the EU. This scenario further strengthens the 
political acceptance interpretation for the budgetary support pay-
ments to Lesotho.  
 
The SACU development component 
The SACU development component was set up to protect 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland against the adverse effects 
stemming from bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. The 
previous chapter discussed how the size of this component as well 
as its disbursal are relatively arbitrary and open-ended. As no 
conditions for its allocation are mentioned, terms and targeting are 
also not specified. This affects the possibilities for adjusting BLNS 
states’ trade policies to higher levels of economic integration. The 
development component’s objective to curb the negative effects 
from bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation suggests that it 
was linked to the BLNS states’ acceptance of the TDCA. Mean-
while, in the absence of well-designed targeting, this tying runs 
counter to an economic adjustment approach.  
The term, targeting, amount and linkage to the TDCA all make 
the SACU development component incomprehensible within a 
narrow economic adjustment model. However, as was the case 
with the EISP, the programme’s ineffectiveness does not impede 
the alternative interpretation. The SACU development compo-
nent’s lack of targeting and term pose no barriers if it intends to 
create political acceptance. Offering a relatively large sum of 
money without a specified purpose does not ease economic 
adjustment. However, this lack of specificity does make sense if 
the goal is to build political support. Finally, the linkage issue in 
combination with insufficient targeting also coincides with the 
latter perspective. 
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Interpreting the findings  
In assessing the four TDCA-related aid components, aspects of 
both an economic adjustment model and a political acceptance 
model have been identified. The EISP is most easily understood 
within the latter framework. The economic adjustment model, 
however, helped account for the objectives of the eighth EDF 
payments as least as well as the political acceptance view. Bud-
getary support to Lesotho, even though eventually not disbursed, 
contained characteristics that were closer to a political acceptance 
interpretation. South Africa’s payments through the SACU 
development component were also primarily compatible with the 
political acceptance model. 
 
Overlapping objectives 
The four aid programmes reflect elements of both views on trade 
and aid relationships. The findings in Chapter Three and Three 
therefore suggest that both perspectives have some applicability. 
Political acceptance and economic adjustment considerations can 
overlap and coexist within the same programme. Finding various 
explanations for the existence of these payments is less contra-
dictory than would appear. The EU at the time of the TDCA 
negotiations consisted of fifteen member states, each tending 
towards the promotion of their individual interests. For the EU to 
run negotiations with outside partners effectively it always needs 
internal compromise between individual members first. Only 
then can it commence negotiations with third parties, which will 
often mean making further concessions.  
This situation of negotiating at different levels with various 
individual state interests is what Robert Putnam has called a 
‘complex multi-level game’. At the domestic level, he argues, 
politicians are pressurised by interest groups. At the international 
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negotiating level politicians have to satisfy domestic groups 
while simultaneously minimising any negative effects of foreign 
developments.11 The bigger the overlap between domestic and 
international demands, the larger a negotiator’s margin for 
reaching an agreement. Within the EU this means that its many 
different members first have to match domestic demands to 
international demands at the EU level. Only then can they match 
their common demands with outside trade partners, such as South 
Africa and the BLNS countries. Certain complex multi-level 
games within EU-ACP relations have existed since the Lomé 
Conventions in 1975.12
Parts of the 1999 TDCA negotiations illustrate the diverging 
interests that can emerge through multi-level EU trade nego-
tiations. During the trade talks, Spain and Portugal requested that 
the terms ‘port’ and ‘sherry’ no longer be used for fortified wines 
from South Africa. These domestic issues were lifted to the 
supra-national EU level when third-party South Africa was con-
fronted with them. Spain and Portugal’s demands influenced the 
EU-South Africa talks and finally led to a situation where the 
TDCA negotiations threatened to stall.13
When deciding on an economic adjustment or a political 
acceptance interpretation for EU compensation payments to the 
BLNS states, similar multi-level interests must be considered. 
According to a European Commission representative in South 
Africa, such diverging motives were clearly present during the 
TDCA negotiations. Whereas the Nordic and Benelux countries 
seemed to be more concerned with the development aims of the 
TDCA, the Southern European countries mainly focused on the 
                                                 
11  Putnam (1988: 434). 
12  Mailafia (1997: 97). 
13  Namibian (1999b). 
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trade objectives of the agreement.14 Similar controversies be-
tween an economic adjustment and a political acceptance ap-
proach could well have existed with regard to compensatory aid 
for the BLNS states.  
The assessment of the four aid programmes to the BLNS states 
has shown that the two objectives can overlap and coexist, both 
between and within programmes. What this study has aimed to do 
is to establish the extent to which each perspective helps to clarify 
the nature of each payment. 
 
Prevailing model and theoretical reflections 
Notwithstanding the overlap between the two models, assess-
ments of the individual compensation programmes show that 
often one perspective clarifies a programme better than another. 
The Economic Integration Support Programme to the BLNS, the 
budgetary support payments to Lesotho and the development 
component of the new SACU agreement all contained features 
that could be explained best with the help of a political 
acceptance model. Where economic integration could be used as 
a model to understand these programmes, it did so only to a 
certain level. Only for the eighth EDF payments did a more overt 
form of economic integration seem to match the evidence better 
than political acceptance did. Regarding the four TDCA-related 
aid programmes, concerns for political acceptance turn out to be 
crucial. 
This means that within the analysis of EU compensatory aid to 
the BLNS states, the importance of state power must be recog-
nised. The EU has tried to introduce reciprocal free trade with the 
BLNS region by offering payments that are based on political 
acceptance considerations. Compensation programmes have been 
                                                 
14  Personal interview with anonymous representative of the EC in South Africa. 
Pretoria (June 2004). 
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oriented at least as much towards winning the political support of 
the BLNS governments as to addressing specific economic 
adjustment problems that are associated with lowering trade 
barriers in the BLNS countries. 
The dichotomy between a state power interpretation and an 
interpretation that focuses on facilitating economic adjustment in 
fact resembles a juxtaposition of the theories of realism and 
liberalism within the trade liberalisation debate. Realism expects 
free trade to be introduced through a confrontation of powers in 
which parties concede as little access as possible to their domes-
tic market.15 Financial compensation serves mainly as a political 
‘sweetener’ to gain acceptance of a trade agreement by one or 
more states that might otherwise not concur with that agreement.  
Liberalism sees the bulk of trade liberalisation put in place by 
the lowering of trade barriers and through the powers of in-
creased trade and investment themselves.16 Financial compensa-
tion, according to liberals, is necessary only on a temporary basis 
and is meant primarily to overcome specific economic adjust-
ment problems. Compensatory payments, they say, limit the 
benefits of economic integration, namely increased competition 
and efficiency. Liberal thinking therefore supports the view that 
if an FTA is not effective due to severe revenue losses for 
African states, that FTA should not or only gradually be in-
stalled.17 Overdependence on foreign funds, many liberals argue, 
creates a situation in which governments shift their account-
ability from the domestic population to the international donor 
system. This creates a lack of political commitment and lowers 
the incentives to reform.18
                                                 
15  Nicholson (2002: 91-97). 
16  Gunning (1999: 22), Jacquet (2002: 3-4). 
17  Mshomba (2000: 199). 
18  Leonard & Straus (2003: 30). 
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These two theories can now be placed against the backdrop of 
the economic adjustment model and the political acceptance 
model for compensation payments. Three out of four aid pro-
grammes appear to be in contrast with the liberal belief that trade 
liberalisation by developing nations should not be dependent on 
the creation of political acceptance. The argument that African 
states go along with more open trade mainly because of seductive 
assistance funds finds much support in the case of the BLNS 
states. This coincides importantly with a realist power model of 
free trade introduction. A purely liberal vision of the relationship 
between trade and aid in the case of the EU and the BLNS states 
becomes increasingly weak. 
Chapter findings 
The changes in levels of trade liberalisation, which the BLNS 
states experienced with the introduction of the new TDCA, 
resulted, to a large extent, from financial pressure from the EU 
and South Africa. This chapter focused on the objectives of 
TDCA-related aid to the BLNS states. It showed that the com-
bination of trade liberalisation and compensation payments, dis-
cussed in Chapters Two and Three, can be structured according 
to two different models. An assessment was made for the four 
compensation programmes discussed in Chapter Three on the 
basis of these two models. The term, targeting, size of payments 
and the tying to TDCA acceptance constituted the four charac-
teristics that helped to determine whether these payments better 
matched an economic adjustment or a political acceptance expla-
nation.  
Although the economic adjustment model proves viable for 
some elements of the payments, the political acceptance model 
explains the objectives of most of the aid programmes better. It 
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can, therefore, be said that the specific payments that this study 
assessed have predominantly been designed to accomplish the 
political acceptance of higher levels of free trade. The EISP, the 
EU budgetary support payments to Swaziland and the SACU 
development component all fit this interpretation to a high 
degree. For at least three of the four compensation programmes, 
economic adjustment has not been the primary objective. Com-
paring this outcome to realism and liberalism theories gives 
strong support for the theory of realism. An interpretation in 
which state power is a dominant influence in the relationship 
between the EU, South Africa and the BLNS states best explains 
the behaviour of these actors. 
 
  
 
 
5 
Summary and  
implications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview  
To present a background against which the origin of compensa-
tion payments could be explained, this study started off by 
assessing the changes in trade relations between the developed 
and the developing world since the period of decolonisation. 
From the 1980s, developing countries have increasingly moved 
towards enhanced levels of trade liberalisation as a result of 
pressure by advanced industrial states. The so-called ‘condition-
ality norm’ helps to explain how the North has managed to 
provide assistance on the condition of policy adjustment in 
developing countries. Western economic dominance, largely due 
to economic shocks in the developing world during the 1980s, an 
expanding conditionality norm resulting from this and increased 
reciprocity in the multilateral trading system constitute the main 
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forms of liberalisation pressure that the developing world as a 
whole has experienced.  
The BLNS states experienced such pressure to liberalise from 
the EU as well as from South Africa. The EU exerted pressure 
directly through the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which was set 
up to change the existing EU-ACP relationship of non-reciprocal 
free trade into a relationship of full reciprocity. Indirectly, it 
exerted such pressure through its FTA with South Africa. By 
2008 the ACP states are meant to have constructed regional 
Economic Partnership Agreements. That way the developing 
countries will profit more easily from the economic benefits of 
economies of scale, such as sustained economic growth, in-
creased competitiveness, the creation of productive jobs and 
better access to social services. The EU-South Africa FTA de 
facto created one such relationship of free trade between the 
BLNS states, South Africa and the EU.  
South Africa can be said to have pursued similar goals of 
enhancing free trade. It has done so not only through the TDCA 
but also through its SADC and NEPAD initiatives. The 2002 
SACU treaty has also functioned as an important step in lowering 
trade barriers. The relationship between the BLNS states, the EU 
and South Africa resulting from these agreements reflects this 
link between western economic and political pressure to liberal-
ise and the shift in BLNS trade policies.  
Aid since the mid-1980s has increasingly been offered on the 
condition that trade barriers in the ACP region would be lowered. 
The TDCA can be regarded as an example of the so-called 
conditionality norm, according to which, trade liberalisation is 
introduced in exchange for financial assistance.  
Besides various non-financial adjustments to the TDCA, three 
different TDCA-related financial compensation instruments have 
been introduced by the EU: the Economic Integration Support 
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Programme to the BLNS, the budgetary support payments to Le-
sotho and various TDCA-related payments granted to Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland under the eighth EDF. A similar combi-
nation of trade liberalisation and compensation payments exists 
within the SACU agreement that the BLNS states and South 
Africa signed in 2002. The development component of this 
agreement provides financial compensation while simultaneously 
dealing with the issue of TDCA concurrence.  
Two models can be turned towards to determine the nature and 
goals of each compensation programme. These are frameworks 
that offer different explanations for the way financial compensa-
tion is used to introduce trade liberalisation in the BLNS region. 
How the relationship between trade and aid is perceived is also 
affected by the extent to which the compensation programmes 
correspond with these two models.  
The first model explains the function of compensation pay-
ments as a way to create political acceptance for a move to trade 
liberalisation. The second model focuses on the building of 
economic adjustment to facilitate the introduction of trade 
liberalisation. Since both models use financial support to spur 
economic policy changes, they both concur with the condition-
ality framework.  
With the help of four different criteria – term, targeting, size of 
payments and tying to TDCA acceptance – it is possible to find 
which of these two models fits the design of the compensation 
programmes best. As a result, the EISP, the budgetary support 
programme for Lesotho and the development component of the 
new SACU treaty appear to fit the political acceptance frame-
work better than the economic adjustment framework. Only those 
compensation payments that were disbursed under the eighth 
EDF do not meet any impediments to an economic adjustment 
point of view. Therefore, the model that explains the majority of 
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the financial compensation programmes most suitably is the 
political acceptance model. This means that creating political 
concurrence with the TDCA has probably been the main aim of 
most payments. A theory of realism, which recognises the im-
portance of state power, underlines many of the political accept-
ance ideas. A liberal theory, stressing the power of market forces 
while pursuing a minimum of state influence, corresponds more 
closely with the economic adjustment model. These liberal 
visions prove less persuasive in the case of trade and aid relations 
between the EU, South Africa and the BLNS countries.  
Significance of findings and possibilities for future 
research 
This study set out to assess the emerging relationship between 
trade liberalisation and financial compensation in BLNS coun-
tries’ dealings with the EU and South Africa. In the introduction 
it was stated that determining the nature of compensation 
payments to the BLNS states would also clarify the current 
relationship between trade and aid in the case of the EU, South 
Africa and the BLNS countries.  
The suitability of a political acceptance interpretation affects 
the relationship between trade and aid as perceived since the 
mid-1980s. If compensation payments to the BLNS states are 
primarily meant as political side payments, the ‘aid for trade’ 
approach – in which aid aims to strengthen developing countries’ 
efforts to participate in the multilateral trading system by 
supporting liberal economic reform – is less persuasive. Al-
though technically aid is still used to achieve free trade, how this 
is done diverges markedly from the existing view among donors. 
EU aid as assessed here aims mainly at accommodating free 
trade acceptance rather than improving structural reform. In the 
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past the EU has stated that it is an important adherent of the ‘aid 
for trade’ debate.1 It can thus be said to have acted in a 
contradictory way regarding most of its compensation payments 
to the BLNS states. South Africa can be seen to have done the 
same when judged by the SACU development component. It 
challenges the ‘aid for trade’ paradigm by using compensation 
that mainly intends to overcome political resistance to free trade 
by the BLNS countries. Because of their contradictory behaviour, 
both the EU and South Africa have disrupted the ‘aid for trade’ 
paradigm.  
The existence of politically oriented compensation payments 
shows how determined the EU and South Africa have been to 
promote free trade with the BLNS countries. It reflects how 
important political cooperation is considered to be when trying to 
build higher levels of free trade. Yet such compensation pay-
ments also affect the popular vision among many advanced 
industrial states that the establishment of free trade is mainly 
promoted through a mutual lowering of trade barriers. In reality, 
pressure instruments such as compensation payments play an 
important role in trying to achieve trade liberalisation. The EU, 
South Africa and countries in the ACP area should seriously take 
into account the consequences of that notion when developing 
future trade and aid relationships. 
In July 2006 the Doha Round of negotiations, which was to 
lower tariffs in trade at the multilateral level, was suspended. 
Gaps between some of the key players proved too great to 
overcome. Until a new round of multilateral trade negotiations is 
set up, establishing trade liberalisation is expected to focus 
mainly on bilateral and regional agreements.2 In the case of the 
                                                 
1  European Council & European Commission (2000). 
2  The suspension of the Doha Round has been called ‘the starting gun for a race 
to conclude bilateral trade deals’. Euractiv (2006). 
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EU and the ACP area, enhancing free trade will move from a 
dual approach – through multilateral negotiations as well as the 
bilateral Cotonou agreement – to a single approach in which 
Cotonou will come to generate most of the attention. The EU’s 
approach towards constituting higher levels of trade liberalisation 
is now likely to become of even greater importance to the ACP 
states, as alternative ways of negotiating trade have significantly 
been reduced. 
As a result of the underdevelopment of economic adjustment 
measures, successful preparation for more open trade by the 
BLNS countries is possibly affected. That can have serious 
implications for economic development in the region. With 
expected production, employment and income losses combined 
with significantly lower customs revenue as well as insufficient 
instruments to curb these effects, the BLNS economies face 
serious economic losses. Donors focusing on trade liberalisation 
to fight poverty should consider these effects when making use 
of compensation payments.  
There is little reason to consider the BLNS governments’ 
acceptance of the TDCA as an indication that the implementation 
of free trade is gaining wider support in the ACP region. The 
policy of promoting free trade as well as serious resistance to it 
have existed for a long time. In light of the necessity of 
politically based payments to curb the BLNS governments’ 
resistance to free trade, recent moves towards enhanced free trade 
are not necessarily the result of widely shifting economic per-
spectives among developing country governments. Instead they 
may largely reflect these countries’ current political vulne-
rability. When cooperation by African countries mainly exists at 
the behest of compensation, scepticism is likely to remain 
dormant. As political leadership, ownership, accountability and a 
long-term vision are crucial for building sustainable institutions, 
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a lack thereof affects the opportunities for economic develop-
ment. 
The findings of this research also make it easier to frame 
expectations regarding the FTAs which the BLNS countries are 
currently negotiating with the US, and Mercosur and regarding 
planned negotiations with India, China and Nigeria. As part of 
the negotiations, the US has already offered US$2 million of 
capacity-building support after SACU had requested compensa-
tion for revenue losses resulting from a future SACU-US FTA.3 
This confirms that similar structures as the ones that occurred in 
the TDCA situation can be expected elsewhere. 
Another area for which this study has implications concerns 
the future EU-ACP negotiations that will deal with the Cotonou 
Agreement’s successor. Both the ACP states and the EU, having 
promised in the Cotonou Agreement to start constituting future 
trade relationships on the basis of full reciprocity, can draw 
lessons from the intrusion of realist politics into the compensation 
programmes that were designed for the BLNS states. ACP coun-
tries will know better what to expect from the EU in terms of 
financial support. The size, required targeting and the conditions 
that are attached to financial compensation will be of special 
interest to them. The EU now has a clearer idea of how 
developing countries can respond to compensation payments. It 
is an example of what the effects could be of the realist approach 
when used for similar funding in alternative situations. 
South Africa’s role in the compensation payments to the 
BLNS states is also useful regarding its relationship with other 
                                                 
3  Telephonic interview with Peter Draper, research fellow with the development 
through trade project at the South African Institute of International Affairs 
(SAIIA). Pretoria, Leiden (August 2004). The US in the past has mentioned that 
its plans for an FTA with the SACU region are a response to the EU’s FTA 
with South Africa. This makes compensation schemes similar to the one the EU 
offered all the more understandable. USTR (2003a). 
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parts of Southern Africa and the rest of the continent. In view of 
its position as a forerunner and leader in many political and 
economic matters within Africa, South Africa can be a favour-
able partner for the EU in future EU-ACP negotiations. The 
relatively close cooperation between the EU and South Africa in 
reaction to the TDCA effects on the BLNS states offers lessons 
for the future. South Africa’s current cooperation with the BLNS 
countries in various SACU FTAs can perhaps now be placed in a 
new framework. Its support for enhanced free trade with the EU 
in the entire SACU region might in fact have been a first step in 
the process of such wider SACU FTA building.  
However, as stated in the introduction, this study was mainly 
set up to find information about the relationship between the 
BLNS states, the EU and South Africa. The findings provide a 
first glance at the role of compensation payments in general but 
further research is needed to decide whether similar forms of 
compensation in a comparable context exist in other situations 
and on a larger scale.  
It is difficult to determine what the future possibilities are for 
the relationship between trade and aid in a broader scenario. The 
findings of this study, that the ‘trade not aid’ and the ‘aid for 
trade’ paradigms have become undermined as a result of the 
prevalence of a political acceptance framework for compensation 
payments to the BLNS countries, are in many ways case sensi-
tive. The BLNS situation does not imply that the same can auto-
matically be argued for the EU’s trade and aid relations with 
other ACP countries, or for other donors. The BLNS states’ 
situation can be regarded a forerunner to the scheduled EU-ACP 
negotiations on the introduction of reciprocal free trade. It is, 
therefore, easy to assume that the EU will hold on to similar 
political acceptance policies for all its aid recipients. However, 
further research is required to provide sufficient evidence for that 
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hypothesis. This study should be seen as an introduction to 
further studies in wider contexts. It has provided the evidence for 
one piece of the puzzle, dealing primarily with the EU, South 
Africa and the BLNS states. 
 
  
  
Appendix: Note on methodology 
 
 
 
 
This study aimed to find out how efforts by the EU and South 
Africa to liberalise trade with the BLNS states operate via a 
system of financial compensation. It assesses the effects of com-
pensatory payments on the relationship between trade and aid. In 
this appendix the methodology that was used for this research is 
outlined in further detail.  
A method of process tracing was used to explain how EU and 
South African pressure have enhanced trade liberalisation in the 
BLNS states and how such pressure has led to a change in the 
relationship between trade and aid. Process tracing explores the 
chain of events that connects an independent variable to an 
outcome. It seeks to provide evidence for each individual step 
within that chain.1  
This approach can be visually captured with the use of a causal 
diagram. In this diagram the independent variable is situated at 
the far left, while the dependent variable, or outcome, is on the 
far right. The variables in between, often referred to as interven-
ing variables, represent the connecting chain of events. Arrows 
are used to refer to cause-effect relationships.2 In the causal 
diagram below, the most important variables of this study, as 
well as their relationship to each other, can be found.  
 
                                                 
1  Van Evera (1997: 64). 
2  Ibid: 10-15. 
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External pressure 
to liberalise by: 
a. EU 
b. SA 
I.  
BLNS move to 
further trade 
liberalisation 
III.  
Financial compensation in the form 
of: 
c. EU aid 
d. SACU development 
component  
II.  
I+II=A 
II+III=B 
I+III=C 
Change in 
trade/aid 
relations 
IV.  
 
The outcome or dependent variable that this research paper 
assesses is the change in relationship between trade and aid (IV). 
The main causal factor of IV, the independent variable, is con-
sidered to be the external pressure by the EU (a) and South 
Africa (b). This factor is discussed in Chapter Two. As major 
intervening variables explaining the causal relationship between I 
and IV, two different factors can be discerned. On the one hand 
there is a move towards enhanced levels of economic integration 
with the EU and South Africa (III). And on the other hand, there 
is financial compensation in the form of EU (c) and South 
African (d) compensation payments to the BLNS states. These 
payments, it is argued, have influenced the level of trade liberali-
sation as implemented by the BLNS states, which makes variable 
II lead up to variable III. And, vice versa, the level of liberalisa-
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tion also determines the nature of compensation payments. While 
the first intervening variable is assessed in Chapter Two, com-
pensation payments are the focus of attention in Chapter Three.  
To explain the interdependence of the two intervening vari-
ables, this study turns to what is called a conditionality frame-
work. Conditionality emerged in the 1980s and is used to explain 
how the disbursement of aid in combination with trade adjust-
ments operates in the case of the BLNS states. Together, these 
two intervening variables create the dependent variable, which 
shows that the relationship between trade and aid in EU-BLNS 
trade relations has shifted.  
The causal relationships that this research assesses are three-
fold. First, Chapter Two discusses the way the EU and South 
Africa have recently used various inducements to influence the 
BLNS states’ behaviour concerning the acceptance of trade liber-
alisation (C). Chapter Three assesses whether the EU and South 
Africa are doing so by offering financial compensation to these 
countries (A). Whether the compensation payments have influ-
enced the level of the BLNS states’ trade liberalisation and vice 
versa (B) is also discussed. The information concerning the 
nature of these compensation payments is taken from EU, South 
African, BLNS states and SACU government documents. This 
information is substantiated with the help of secondary sources. 
These include interviews that were conducted by the author with 
EU and South African government representatives and with 
independent experts on the research topic. Other academic re-
search and newspaper articles have also been extensively used.  
In Chapter Four, two different models help to determine how 
the EU and South Africa have used compensation payments to 
push for trade liberalisation in the BLNS countries. One model 
explains the aim of compensation as being to stimulate economic 
adjustments. The other considers such funding as a form of side-
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payments that have the primary aim of establishing political 
support for a move towards trade liberalisation. Focusing on four 
characteristics of the various compensation payments, Chapter 
Four assesses which model each payment corresponds best with 
and hence which best explains the objectives of each payment. 
Ultimately, this study formulates the extent to which the relation-
ship between trade and aid has changed regarding the EU, South 
Africa and the BLNS states. It provides an answer as to whether 
the ‘aid for trade’ paradigm is still valid.  
 
Class of relevant cases 
The class of relevant cases from which the BLNS states were 
selected consists of a large group of ACP countries.3 These coun-
tries all maintain trade-related aid programmes with the EU 
under the provisions of the Lomé IV Agreement. The vast 
majority of ACP states are classified as either lower-income 
developing countries or least-developed nations. Most receive 
official development support from the EU through the European 
Investment Bank and the European Development Fund. All ACP 
states have recently started negotiations for a new trade agree-
ment with the EU. That agreement is to eventually succeed the 
provisions under Lomé IV, which officially ended in 2000. As 
opposed to the non-reciprocal trade relationship that the EU 
maintained with the ACP states from 1975, the new agreement is 
set to be built on a basis of reciprocity. The case of trade liberali-
sation pressure by the EU on the BLNS states fits well within 
that group. 
As part of the successor treaty to Lomé, the EU plans to con-
struct Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with regional 
groupings of states. There are various regional groupings on the 
African continent that are eligible for constructing these future 
                                                 
3  There are 78 ACP countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific region. 
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EPAs. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
which encompasses SACU, is one of those. Also the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Eco-
nomic Community of Central African States (CEEAC) are 
existing economic communities that are considered as bases on 
which to construct EPAs.4
Besides their relationship with the EU, many of the African 
ACP countries also maintain strong ties with South Africa. Since 
1994, South Africa has rapidly intensified its cooperation with 
other African states. Strengthening political and economic links 
in the region is considered a primary objective of the current 
government. The manner in which it pursues these goals is based 
on a market model of free trade and regional integration.5 The 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), of which 
South Africa is one of the founding nations, stimulates similar 
cooperative plans for the entire continent. South Africa’s trade 
liberalisation pressure on the BLNS states therefore also fits in 
the context of a larger group of African states.  
Many of the economic adjustments that countries in the ACP 
region have made since the mid-1980s have been effected within 
a framework of conditionality. In exchange for development 
assistance, states have been encouraged to implement measures 
of enhanced trade liberalisation. Such conditioned aid has been 
an instrument for highly industrialised countries in the North to 
stimulate their developing partners towards greater economic 
integration. Since the beginning of Lomé IV in 1990, the EU has 
shifted its aid policy towards stronger conditionality.6 The condi-
tionality norm, which also occurs prominently in the case of the 
                                                 
4  European Research Office (2004b). 
5  Nkuhlu (1997: 80). 
6  Haggard (1995: 24). 
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BLNS states, has been expanded further with the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
Both the independent variable and the two intervening vari-
ables which the diagram above outlines exist in a wider range of 
cases involving the EU, South Africa and the ACP countries. The 
pressure to liberalise as well as the combination of trade liberali-
sation and development assistance – the conditionality norm – 
are factors that exist in a larger African context.  
 
Positioning within the class of relevant cases 
Within this broader range of cases, the BLNS states occupy a 
‘typical’ position. But even though typical, the BLNS states are 
not entirely representative of their class. Their long history as a 
union – SACU is the world’s oldest customs union – as well as 
their remarkable effectiveness form a contrast with many other 
regional groupings in Africa.  
However, this effectiveness has made many believe that 
SACU should function as a building block for a bigger customs 
union comprising the fourteen SADC countries.7 Because inter-
nal trade barriers within SACU do not exist, the Trade, Devel-
opment and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa has intro-
duced free trade with the EU for the entire SACU region. SACU 
is therefore the first regional organisation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
with which the EU maintains a reciprocal trade relationship. 
Consequently, it virtually qualifies as a member of an Economic 
Partnership Agreement.8 SACU forms a good test case for other 
African states that are currently renegotiating their trade and 
development relationships with the EU.  
Concerning their relationship with South Africa, the BLNS 
states also have characteristics that are typical of their class. The 
                                                 
7  Gibb (1997: 68). 
8  ECDPM (2001c). 
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South African government has pushed for further trade liberali-
sation in the SACU area since 1994.9 In view of its aims of intro-
ducing enhanced free trade and strengthening regional integration 
within Africa, South Africa’s relationship with the BLNS states 
can be said to function as an exemplary model for the entire 
continent. By 2010 South Africa intends to have set up a Free 
Trade Area within the Southern African Development Commu-
nity (SADC).10 The well-developed and far-evolved Southern 
African Customs Union, all members of which are part of SADC, 
can be seen as a strong building block for South Africa’s future 
relations with the SADC area.  
Finally, the EU’s close cooperation with South Africa in 
creating a de facto FTA for SACU through the TDCA can be 
seen as a test case for South Africa’s position in future EU-ACP 
negotiations. South Africa’s strong relationship with many 
African states as well as its African development plans make it a 
favourable partner for the EU. An assessment of South Africa’s 
role in the BLNS countries’ relationship with the EU therefore 
provides valuable information for the entire continent. Having 
made use of the conditionality framework, the EU and South 
Africa might both very well undertake similar efforts on a larger 
scale in the future.  
 
 
                                                 
9  Gibb (1997: 84). 
10  Mail & Guardian (2006a). 
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